Infants and clinical research: legal and ethical perspectives by Ng, May
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFANTS AND CLINICAL RESEARCH: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
Sze May NG 
 
September 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of 
Liverpool for the degree of Master of Laws (LLM) by Research 
 
 
 
2 
 
Prepared under the supervision of:  
 
 
Professor Helen Stalford 
Professor of Law and Director of the European Children's Rights Unit  
Liverpool Law School 
University of Liverpool 
 
Dr Paula Case 
Director of Learning and Teaching 
Liverpool Law School 
University of Liverpool 
 
Professor Michael Jones 
Professor of Common Law 
Liverpool Law School 
University of Liverpool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is original. No portion of this work has 
been submitted in support of an application for degree or qualification of this or any 
other University or Institute of learning. Where the works of others have been used, 
references have been provided, and in some cases, quotations have been made. It is in 
this regard that I declare this work as originally mine. It is hereby presented in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of LLM by Research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Sze May NG 
MBBS (Hons) DCH FRCPCH FHEA MSc LLM PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my father Ng Keng Hoong and my mother Teh Ai Lay. You 
have always taught me that I could achieve anything if I set my mind to it, and all that 
you have instilled in me has led me to many achievements in this lifetime. For each and 
every one of those achievements, I owe to both of you.  
 
Thank you for your love, your endless support and encouragement and for always 
believing I can reach for the stars. 
 
“It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare; it is because we do not dare 
that they are difficult” 
Seneca, Roman Philosopher 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
My heartfelt thanks to Professor Michael Jones whose thoughtful consideration, advice 
and direction has been invaluable throughout this journey. Our debates have often 
motivated and inspired me towards improving this work. My sincere thanks to Professor 
Helen Stalford who provided valuable feedback, support and insightful guidance that 
made it possible for me to complete this thesis. My immense gratitude and appreciation 
also goes to Dr Paula Case whose constructive comments, critique and encouragement 
were equally invaluable. I am most grateful to have benefited from the supervision of 
such distinguished academics and acknowledged experts in the field. 
 
Thanks to my brother Wai Tong and my sister Audrey for your love, the warm 
memories of our siblinghood and for keeping in touch always, even though you are 
thousands of miles away. 
 
Thanks to my husband Eugene for your patience, love and continual support of my 
academic endeavours over the past decades, and to my wonderful children Brendan, 
Darren and Corinne who keep giving me so much happiness. 
 
Last, but not least, thanks be to God for the life I have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Dr Sze May Ng 
          
                                       MBBS (Hons) DCH FRCPCH FHEA MSc LLM PhD 
6 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents an overview of legal and ethical aspects in relation to infants 
involved in clinical research. The future health of infants and children depend on 
clinical research which is an important part of medical progress. This thesis will show 
that there is a need for research involving infants but there are gaps in the current legal 
and ethical framework which are not readily applicable to research involving infants. 
There exist a mismatch between what is practised in relation to clinical research 
involving infants and the current regulatory approach. This has contributed to a lack of 
understanding and conflicting interpretations as to the way in which research is being 
conducted in this vulnerable population. There are significant challenges in trying to 
achieve a balance between what is socially good and the obligation to protect infants 
who participate in research. The principles of best interests standards and how it is 
applied in the context of research involving infants is explored. Therefore, the thesis 
aims at capturing the underlying legal, regulatory and ethical perspectives related to 
research involving infants and draws together key conclusions on how we might address 
the identified gaps in the current legal and ethical framework.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For medicine to continue to save and/or better the lives of individuals, experimentation 
with human subjects is an absolute must. New drugs, new equipment and new methods 
that can transform people’s lives for the better now and in the future have to be tested on 
live subjects in the present. That testing has to be conducted within ethical frameworks 
that ensure the safety of participants. This is nowhere more important than in medical 
research on children and infants and yet, as this thesis testifies, there remains a paucity 
of legal and ethical guidance on how research involving infants should be conducted and 
how parental rights and responsibilities are determined when allowing their infants to 
participate in research. 
 
As a paediatric clinician and an academic researcher, I have recruited hundreds 
of infants and preterm neonates into therapeutic and non-therapeutic research studies 
with the scientific aim of improving our knowledge to benefit future populations of 
infants. There are large numbers of non-therapeutic research studies currently recruiting 
infants and preterm infants to study the genetics of disease, pharmacokinetics of drugs 
or physiological studies of hormonal effects that offer no direct benefit to the individual 
participants.1 My personal experience of recruiting infants in therapeutic and non-
therapeutic clinical trials, and the processes involved in the ethics and consent 
procedures as a researcher, have led me to question the application of current research 
regulatory guidance and the ethical/ legal framework for conducting research involving 
infants. As a clinician, I have encountered difficulties in the context of research 
involving infants. If the central aim of global ethical principles should be to ensure that 
any decision is child-centred and that it should protect the infant’s rights to the 
maximum extent possible, then our current research organisations and application of 
clinical therapeutic and non-therapeutic trial set-ups using research regulatory guidance 
raise many questions that appear to conflict with existing ethical and legal principles.  
                                                 
1 For further information on these areas of study, inter alia, see: (1) www.bapm.org/trials/trial.php; (2) 
www.ukctg.nihr.ac.uk/trialdetails/NCT01319435; (3) Ng SM, Turner MA, Gamble C, Didi M, Victor S, 
Manning D, Settle P, Gupta R, Newland P, Weindling AM. (2013) ‘An explanatory randomised placebo 
controlled trial of levothyroxine supplementation for babies born <28 weeks’ gestation: results of the 
TIPIT trial’, Trials, 14: 211; and (4) The BOOST II United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand 
Collaborative Groups (2013) ‘Oxygen saturation and outcomes in preterm infants’, N Engl J Med; 368: 
2094. 
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The Declaration of Helsinki states that “in medical research in human subjects, 
considerations related to the well-being of human subjects should take precedence over 
the interest of science and society".2 The foundation of this approach when applied to 
research involving infants is to ensure the protection of infants as research subjects 
within this vulnerable population. However, there exists a mismatch between what we 
think guidance is and what is practised in relation to research involving infants, raising 
questions as to the need for current legislation to be more flexible. I will also argue in 
the next section that research remains an important part of medical progress and infants 
are a unique population where there is a need for research involving infants to improve 
their health. 
 
1.1 Why is there a Need for Research Involving Infants? 
 
Alarmingly, there is a lack of medical research involving children and, 
consequently, over two thirds of children in hospitals are being prescribed unlicensed 
medications in the absence of such research.3 The figure rises to over 60% in infant 
populations.4 Hawcutt and Smyth (2008) suggest that 50% of medicines used in infants 
are based on anecdotal data or extrapolated from adult data on medicinal products.5 This 
problem is particularly acute because, across the world, up to 80% of drugs that are 
approved for adults are not approved or labelled for use in children.6 These statistics 
raise grave concerns among health professionals involved in the care of children. The 
extrapolation of data from adults is arguably unsafe and necessitates testing in infants 
and children, whether it is a novel agent or studying the pharmacokinetics of existing 
medicines in order to make drugs safer. Children are often prescribed drugs that have 
only been tested in adults, even though children often respond differently to such 
medicines. The extensive use of drugs not licensed to treat children has led to the 
                                                 
2 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (2000) (6th version, adopted in South Korea October 2008) Edinburgh WMA [herein 
after “World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects”]. 
3  Hawcutt DB and Smyth RL. (2008) 'Drug development for children: how is pharma tackling an unmet 
need?' IDrugs, 11(7): 502-507. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Hawcutt DB and Smyth RL. (2008) 'The new European regulation on pediatric medicines: regulatory 
perspective', Paediatric Drugs, 10(33): 143-6. 
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conclusion that children are already being used as research subjects, but without the 
controlled supervision of a clinical trial or a systematic commitment to learn how to use 
the drug.7 There has been widespread criticism that perhaps unethical research is being 
carried out without any form of legislation. Such "unlicensed drugs" or "off-label use" 
means that a drug is being used for a purpose within a paediatric population for which it 
has not been approved by the regulatory agencies.8  
 
In the United States, children were not initially included in clinical trials relating 
to AIDS in the 1990s, with the result that cutting-edge therapies offered to afflicted 
adults were not made available to younger carriers of the disease.9 Considering that the 
choice for these children was either to include them in risky research or to allow them to 
die from AIDS, it no longer seemed as morally objectionable to include them in clinical 
trials.10 This acceptance of children with AIDS as research subjects has given way to a 
more general acceptance of children as research subjects.  
 
The protection of child health requires that the safety and efficacy of drugs 
administered to children have been verified by, for example, pharmacokinetic studies. 
These studies investigate the way in which medicines are absorbed including the route 
of administration intravenously, orally or topically, the way in which they are excreted 
and distributed within the body, and the relationship between the dose of medication and 
the concentration of a medicine in the blood. In pharmacodynamics, developmental 
changes can also affect the drug receptors that mediate how medicines act in the body. 
Infants as a group differ physiologically from older children and adults and it is essential 
that medical research does not exclude this group from the general population.11 Infants 
require different medications that are suitable to their needs at the time, and the practice 
of simply extrapolating treatment regimens and administrations from adults, or simply 
lowering the dose of the medications administered to the infants merely by estimating 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Edwards S and Mc Namee MJ (2005) 'The ethical concerns regarding guidelines for the conduct of 
clinical research on children', Journal of Medical Ethics, 1: 421. 
11 Studies in 2011 show that the use of unlicensed and “off-label” medicines in children is widespread. It 
was reported that between 50-80% of the medicines currently administered to children have neither been 
tested nor authorized for their use in the paediatric population which represents approximately 25% of the 
whole European population. See Knellwolf AL  (2011) ‘Framework conditions facilitating paediatric 
clinical research’, Italian Journal of Paediatrics, 37: 12. 
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the infants to the proportionate weight and size of the adult, is unacceptable. In the area 
of pharmacokinetics, research is required to study the formulations of drugs and to 
determine the pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic parameters of drugs in different 
age groups. These studies are critical and morally obligated in paediatric care because 
they provide the basis for different formulations of drugs for children that avoid the 
dangers of either toxicity or under dosing based on extrapolation from studies conducted 
in adult populations. Determining how children’s development affects drugs in the body 
is both a major rationale and a significant challenge for paediatric research. Such 
research protocols must be generally conducted in children as data cannot be safely 
extrapolated from adult studies. Medicinal products that show non-linearity in terms of 
absorption, distribution and elimination may require a steady state study protocol often 
involving 24 to 36 hour time intervals of scheduled blood sampling following a dose 
administration in neonates, infants or children.12 Children are usually not subjected to 
dose escalation studies. However, such studies are essential in answering questions of 
patho-physiological factors that cause dose-concentration changes, to what degree the 
appropriate dose of medications should be given to provide effectiveness and avoid 
harm in this population.  
 
 Clinical research is also needed in infants because certain medical conditions - 
such as prematurity and their related complications - only affect infants and neonates.13 
We will never know if adult tested medications or drugs are safe for children and infants 
unless medical research is undertaken to investigate their effectiveness and safety. The 
long-term surveillance of drug effect on safety, growth and development are equally 
important to monitor and such surveillance can only be done in this age cohort. The 
legality of such non-therapeutic trials remains debatable in view of the ethical problems 
in repeated blood sampling required with no direct benefit to the infants participating in 
such non-therapeutic research. However, research is needed to improve the delivery of 
such medication to infants, for instance either to improve compliance via the route of 
administration or to identify alternative routes to reduce associated side effects. It can 
                                                 
12 Ceriotti F, Hinzmann R, and Panteghini M. (2009) Reference intervals: 'the way forward', Ann Clin 
Biochem, 46 (1): 8-17. 
13 Choonara I and Conroy S. (2002) ‘Unlicensed and off-label drug use in children: implications for 
safety’, Drug Safety, 25: 11. A study of the Physicians’ Desk Reference showed that there was a 39% 
decrease in the number of prescription entities licensed for the neonate between 1998 and 2007. See 
Young L, et al., (2008) ‘Access to prescribing information for paediatric medicines in the USA: post 
modernization’, British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 67(3): 341. 
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also be argued that participation in non-therapeutic drug research may benefit the 
participant in the foreseeable future should they require the use of the medication that 
was being studied. 
 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
  
This thesis will argue that there is a need for research involving infants but that 
there are gaps in the basic legal and ethical framework relating to infants in research. 
The current framework is not sufficiently adapted to infants or flexible enough to 
respond to the needs of infants, and research and the broad principles such as best 
interests are themselves subject to a high degree of interpretation. This thesis will 
concentrate on the population of infants and will critically explore the best interests 
standard in relation to clinical research. The general statements of research principles 
that currently exist are generic to research involving children but are not readily 
applicable to research involving infants. Infants are unique as a research group and they 
undergo striking maturational changes following birth. Infants are also completely 
vulnerable and are unable to express their fears, needs or defend their own interests: 
they are dependent on their parents and guardians to act in their best interests. 
Potentially any adverse effects they experience from participation in clinical research 
may substantially impact on their development and education, and certain adverse 
effects from the research may cause long-term harm such as impairing growth and 
development.  
Since the 1950s, medical research has substantially improved the lives of tens of 
thousands of infants by the development of vaccines for polio and measles.14 The 
successful eradication of smallpox was based on medical research.15 Treatments that are 
safe and effective for adults may be dangerous or ineffective for children. For example, 
radiation therapy can disrupt normal tissue recovery, maturation and development in 
children if given at inappropriate doses that may be used in adults. This presents a 
dilemma as to how we make medications and drugs safer for children and infants while 
not being able to eliminate the potential for harm to children and infants who are 
                                                 
14 Wehrle PF and Wilkins J. (1981) 'Immunizing agents: potential for controlling or eradicating infectious 
diseases', Annu Rev Public Health, 23: 363-395. 
15 Stuart-Harris C. (1984) 'Prospects for the eradication of infectious diseases', Review of Infectious 
Diseases, 6(3): 405-411. 
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research participants. Should we stop recruitment that may be of benefit to the 
individual? Should research involving infants cease if there are no direct or obvious 
benefits to the individual? How do we quantify risk to the infants who are recruited 
without knowing the nature of the future risk (especially when the risks or benefits are 
unknown)? To what extent can absolute permission be given by parental consent or 
assent for a child to participate in the research which carries a risk of harm and offers no 
direct medical benefit? Are there potential conflicts between the concept of the infant’s 
welfare and parental authority? It is these questions that are so central to this thesis.  
  
Infants lack capacity to consent and therefore are unable to meet the standards of 
making any decision for themselves. This means that medical interventions and 
decisions on whether to embark on them are decided by medical practitioners, 
researchers and parents. To set the scene for the analysis that follows, Chapter 2 will 
outline the different contexts within which research involving infants is conducted, 
drawing a distinction between the types of clinical research and, in particular, between 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. It will also discuss whether participation of 
infants in non-therapeutic research is ever justified. Chapter 2 then presents a quick 
historical overview to chart the evolution of laws that govern research involving 
children. In particular, it covers the unethical experimentations on children during 
World War II,16 as well as the Nuremberg Code in 1947,17 the first major international 
document to provide guidelines on research ethics. It also discusses how current social, 
legal and medical influences have given rise to a presumption in favour of children's 
participation in clinical trials and examines the need for an ethical framework to guide 
decision-making in this context. Chapter 3 considers the role and principles of the 
current ethical and regulatory framework in providing the basic standards with which 
medical research involving infants should comply. It is argued that in the context of 
research involving infants, the global standards on the rights of the child lack consensus 
and directionality as there are particular difficulties in the application of these principles 
and standards within the specific context of medical research involving infants. This will 
provide the framework for examining the legal and ethical implications of recruiting 
infants into clinical trials in the present day. It will also show that that there is currently 
                                                 
16 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunal: part 3 (1946) London: His Majesty's 
Stationary Office, 44. 
17 ‘The Nuremberg code', Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (1991) 19(3-4): 266. 
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an absence of legal and ethical guidance on research involving infants which has 
contributed to a lack of understanding and conflicting interpretations as to the way in 
which research should be conducted in this population.  
 
 Chapter 4 moves on to explore parental rights and responsibilities in relation to 
research, and will discuss what is acceptable risk to infants during the conduct and 
participation in research and how it may contradict the best interests standard which is 
central to children’s rights discourse. Chapter 5 discusses the obligations of informed 
consent and explores whether infants’ rights are truly adhered to in the consenting 
procedures within the current research regulatory framework. Chapter 6 further explores 
arguments in support of and against the concept of best interests in the light of more 
utilitarian arguments when applied to research involving infants. Utilitarianism in this 
setting explores the logic for the need of participating in research to benefit society and 
similar populations of infants. While this is not a key focus of the thesis, the discussion 
on utilitarianism judgements versus best interests of the individual using Bland and Re A 
cases support the broader analyses of current ideologies in clinical research pertaining to 
infants. Chapter 7 seeks to review and make recommendations as to how some of the 
identified gaps in the legal and ethical guidance for research involving infants might be 
addressed. Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the key conclusions of this research.  
 
A central tenet of this thesis is that the core principle of the best interests 
standard is in conflict with the regulatory research framework that is currently applied to 
infants particularly within non-therapeutic research. The thesis reveals how a simplistic 
application of the best interests principle in research involving infants will have a 
detrimental effect for this vulnerable population. The best interests standard is difficult 
to apply in its entirety and, arguably, the concept of infants’ rights cannot be sensibly 
applied as they lack capacity. Furthermore, taking an absolute view of the principal 
standard will ultimately stop research involving infants and deny this population any 
medical progress in the future. A more wider principle may recognise that infants have 
rights and these may also be extended to the right to adopt a utilitarian approach by 
allowing parents the right and responsibility to make informed decisions regarding 
enrolling their infants into research such that their infants’ interests are not undermined 
but complement the interests of society more generally. Such an approach can be 
16 
 
reconciled with the best interests principle if a ‘global’ perspective of the best interests 
of all infants is adopted and it can be justifiable within the conduct of the research 
involving minimally invasive procedures with trivial risk and discomfort that are short-
lived. Further, there is a need for more elaboration of current standards and the 
development of more robust ethical and legal frameworks surrounding the decision-
making processes and conduct of research involving infants. 
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CHAPTER 2: THERAPEUTIC AND NON-THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH AND A 
HISTORY OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN 
  
 
2.1 Types of Clinical Research 
 
 There are two types of clinical research - therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
research - yet there are no authoritative definitions for either of these terms. Generally 
speaking, therapeutic research consists of studies that have a therapeutic intention and 
are trials which recruit patient subjects and provide a specific form of treatment to the 
patients to study its impact on a particular disease. Non-therapeutic research does not 
provide a treatment for the participants but instead focuses on aspects of the particular 
disease and how it progresses.   
 
Within clinical trials, evaluation of new treatments is defined by three different 
phases. Phase I studies are the most basic of clinical trials where the drugs are tested to 
evaluate the dosages and effect of the treatment, and whether the treatment can be 
administered and what the maximum tolerated dosages are. Drugs are often given at 
gradually increasing dosages until there are unacceptable side effects.18 As it remains 
unknown whether the treatment will be effective against a particular disease, people 
with a variety of diseases are often enrolled so Phase I trials are often classed as non-
therapeutic research as the participants are, as Foster (2009) notes, true ‘guinea pigs’ as 
the research has no therapeutic benefit and the ‘researcher’ does not intend to treat the 
research subjects.19 In Phase II studies, the results from Phase I studies are implemented 
to patient subjects and the treatment is targeted towards patients who have responded 
most favourably in Phase I trials. Phase III studies are those trials that will progress to 
further test the standard treatment (or current best) against the conventional treatment or 
alternatives of the intended drug.20 Phase III trials are those that most children will 
participate in. The most commonly performed research are therapeutic clinical trials 
which evaluate medical therapies on patients in a strictly controlled manner and the 
                                                 
18 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations /SI 2004/1031  
19 Foster C (2009) The Ethics of Medical Research in Humans, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
89. 
20 Ibid. 
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purpose of such trials is to determine whether or not the treatment options are safer, 
better or more effective than the current standard care. Ethically, therapeutic controlled 
trials are more justifiable to conduct as it is required to clarify the efficacy or safety over 
the standard care, and as such, the subjects stand to benefit from being a participant in 
the research.  
 
 In these therapeutic clinical research trials, the treatment that is the subject of the 
clinical research is compared with conventional available treatment. In other randomised 
controlled trials, for conditions having no effective treatment available, the control 
regimen to which the new treatment is compared is usually either an observation or 
administration of a placebo which is a substance or medication that has no therapeutic 
effect, used purely as a control. It has been argued that placebo-controlled trials may be 
ethically conducted as long as there is no known effective therapy that exists for the 
condition and as long as omission of such treatments would not increase risk of death or 
irreversible morbidity, and patients are fully informed about their alternatives.21 For 
example, in TIPIT - a randomised controlled trial of thyroxine supplementation in 
extreme preterm infants22 - there was clinical uncertainty about whether apparently low 
plasma FT4 concentrations which are commonly found in these preterm infants should 
be treated or not with thyroxine supplementation to improve neurodevelopment. The 
current practice for these infants was to offer no treatment or supplementation with 
thyroxine, because it remains unknown whether the infants may or may not benefit from 
thyroxine. Therefore it was justifiable to conduct this trial with infants recruited to either 
the treatment arm or the placebo arm.  
 
2.2 Judicial Interpretation of Therapeutic Research: Simms v Simms 
 
 The judicial view of therapeutic research can perhaps be best illustrated from the 
case of Simms v Simms and An NHS Trust.23 Jonathan Simms, an 18 year old male 
patient from Belfast, was diagnosed with a new variant of Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease 
(CJD), a degenerative neurological disorder of the brain that is invariably fatal. There 
                                                 
21 Reynolds T. (2000) ‘The ethics of placebo-controlled trials’, Ann Intern Med. 133:491-2. 
22 It should be noted I was the primary grant holder and researcher on this project. See, for further 
information, Ng SM, et al., (2008) 'Tipit: A randomised controlled trial of thyroxine in preterm infants 
under 28 weeks’ gestation', Trials, 9(17): 137. 
23 Simms v Simms [2003] 1 All ER 669 
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was no recognised treatment or cure available, but overseas medical research had 
identified a novel treatment which inhibited the formation of abnormal protein prion in 
animal studies. His parents wanted him to receive that experimental treatment which, at 
the time, had not been previously tested on humans. Expert committees of the 
Department of Health (DoH) and of the local NHS Hospital Trust refused to approve the 
therapy sought. Both the DoH’s CJD Therapy Advisory Group and the Committee on 
the Safety of Medicine’s views were that given the lack of data on safety and 
effectiveness, there was no logical basis for prescribing experimental protein prions in 
cases of CJD and it was further recommended by the expert committees that animal 
trials were necessary before the advice could be changed. Jonathan’s parents sought 
declarations that their son lacked capacity to consent to treatment and that it was lawful 
as being in their best interests for them to receive the proposed treatment. The Courts 
held that the parents could consent to a novel treatment that has been used in 
experimental research given that there was no alternative treatment available. The 
decision in this case was significant for three key reasons: first, it recognised that 
doctors have a certain leeway to use therapies that have not yet been fully tested as to 
safety or efficacy; second, it specifically permitted such innovative and unproven 
therapies or treatment even where the patient is incompetent; and, third, it confirmed the 
tendency of the Courts to evaluate and in certain cases reject the views of medical 
experts on the appropriate use of health care resources.24 The Courts therefore formed a 
relational view of the best possible interests for the patient who lacked capacity, taking 
into account the practical attitude and wishes of the patient’s relatives which then set the 
parameters of decision-making concerning using experimental and unproven therapies 
in a clinical situation that was proven to be incurable and eventually fatal.  
 
Although the Simms case does not provide any authority in relation to 
justification of randomised controlled trials or experimental research, can the reasoning 
behind the Simms case be transposed to any research so that if there is a possibility of 
benefit to the subject it is lawful to proceed with the trial? Some may argue that the 
Simms case cannot be applied analogously to any other situations as it was a desperate 
situation with little to lose and the judgment only provided guidance on what may be 
                                                 
24 Harrington JA. (2003) Deciding best interests: medical progress, clinical judgement and the good 
family, Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2003/issue3/harrington3.html 
20 
 
lawful, not what may be ethical.25 As stated in the introduction, there is a paucity of 
legal and regulatory guidance relating to infants who are incompetent and incapable of 
giving assent for research and, at present, infants are being recruited to both therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic research because it is recognised that there is a need for research in 
this population. Conversely, it may not be ethically justifiable that therapeutic research 
participation may significantly harm or cause significant distress to the infant as a 
research subject. The British Medical Association (BMA) in 2004 stated that where a 
child is deemed as incompetent by age or illness, the parent(s) or legal guardian(s) will 
be able to consent to therapeutic research.26 The decision of the Court in Simms vs 
Simms to allow this experimental novel treatment was not reached from any reasonable 
logic because such an experimental treatment had never been tested full for safety nor 
efficacy. The case illustrates that a kind of common sense judgment was undertaken in 
an unusual case which was dependent to a significant extent on the reasoning of the 
deciding judge. It is argued here that the judge provided a lawful reasoning to achieve 
the desired result from a difficult situation. 
 
2.3  Is Non-Therapeutic Research Justified? 
 
 Non-therapeutic research trials are trials that do not provide any treatment 
benefits to the subjects, but instead seek to study important factors which may help 
advance the understanding of a disease, its impact or its progression.27 For example, 
non-therapeutic studies may look at collection of tissue specimens to examine the cell 
structure of a form of cancer, or may collect blood samples to understand the effects of 
pharmaco-dynamics of certain drugs. Other studies may track epidemiological 
information such as the long-term health effects of chemotherapy or collect DNA to 
better understand the genetics of the disease. Non-therapeutic trials offer no personal 
benefit to the individuals who participate compared to therapeutic trials. The principle 
therefore that clinical research involving children should confer a direct personal benefit 
                                                 
25 Kennedy I and Grub A, eds., Medical Law (Butterworths, London, 2000), 213. 
26 British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today: The BMA Handbook of Ethics and Law (BMA, 
London, 2004), 132. 
27 Yeung, V. (2007) ‘Clinical trials in children’, in I. Wong, C. Tuleu, I. Castelllo, V. Yeung, & P. Long 
(eds.),Pediatric Drug Handling (Pharmaceutical Press, London), 85-115. 
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to the child and that the interests of the child must prevail over the interests of science or 
society cannot apply to non-therapeutic research.28  
 
In the Declaration of Helsinki,29 first issued by the World Medical Association’s 
Committee on Medical Ethics in 1964, a need was recognised for professional 
guidelines designed by physicians for physicians to define diagnostic and therapeutic 
methods of experimentation. Medical research was classified into two groups: 
‘experiments in new diagnostic and therapeutic methods’ and ‘experiments undertaken 
to serve other purposes than simply to cure an individual’. The Declaration was an 
authoritative and influential source of guidance for researchers involved in scientific 
research with human subjects and attempts were made to distinguish between 
therapeutic research and non-therapeutic research, in various terms of the Declaration 
and guidance. However, the most recent version of the Declaration (2008) removed that 
explicit distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.30  
 
 There were arguments against the revisions of the Declaration such as it should 
remain ‘a shield protecting the vulnerable, children, the senile and the mentally 
handicapped’, and that despite the difficulties in defining therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research, in practice it was very useful to distinguish if research was 
intended to benefit an individual research subject or not, and therefore making it useful 
for research ethics committees in assessing research protocols.31 The editor of the 
British Bulletin of Medical Ethics, Richard Nicholson, stated that “in what seems sadly 
to be American bioethical imperialism, the World Medical Association’s Committee on 
Medical Ethics wants to make life easier for American researchers, and such a proposal 
was born of the self-interests of American researchers, and not the interests of medical 
research worldwide”.32 Nicholson further argued that “to satisfy the perceived needs of 
the American researcher and to change the document completely, was for the sake of a 
                                                 
28 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations /SI 2004/1031  
29 The evolution of the Declaration of Helsinki is covered later in this chapter, however, it is introduced 
here for the purposes of the current discussion on whether non-therapeutic research is justifiable.    
30 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects. See Article 27, (6th version, adopted in South Korea October 2008) and Article 17 of the 
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(Oviedo, 4.IV.1997). 
31 Nicholson RH. (2000) 'Editorial', Bull Med Ethics, 1: 160. 
32 Ibid. 
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small bunch of American researchers, who want greater freedom to behave 
unethically”.33 
 
 On the contrary, the main arguments for the revision of the Declaration that 
ultimately constructed the 2000 version was that the previous edition did not keep 
abreast with changing research activities and the distinction between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic research was an impracticable and unfeasible one that could lead to 
undesirable consequences. Levine34 argued that the Declaration of Helsinki was a 
flawed document in that it relied on the illogical distinction between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic research. For Levine, research cannot be meaningfully divided into a 
therapeutic or a non-therapeutic category because it is unclear whether such labels refer 
to the project as whole or to the individual participants. Some research projects benefit 
certain individuals but not others as in randomised controlled trials where the control 
participants have no benefit. It may be wrongly presumed by others that therapeutic 
research confers a benefit and that non-therapeutic research confers none, yet the risk of 
harm in therapeutic research may be considerable, and the risks involved in non-
therapeutic research is negligible.35 It remains difficult to define regulatory parameters 
of research because of such vague definitions. 
 
 In October 2000 the VI-version of the Declaration of Helsinki was adopted 
unanimously following a prolonged and protracted consultation, and the document was 
finalised without the explicit distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
research. The removal of the non-therapeutic category in the final 2000 version was 
replaced with a new category related to ‘additional principles for medical research 
combined with medical care’ to highlight the fact that where research was combined 
with medical care, additional measures should be undertaken to ensure the safety of 
human participants in research. It was argued that although the language had been 
removed, the concept stayed the same.36  
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Levine RJ. (2000) 'Some recent developments in the international guidelines on the ethics of research 
involving human subjects', Ann N Y Acad Sci, 2: 918. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Mason S and Megone C. European Neonatal Research: Consent, Ethics Committees and Law 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 4. 
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 It can be argued that the construction of the 2000 Declaration in relation to the 
boundary between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research means that such vagueness 
and difference in interpretation and demarcation of what constitutes therapeutic or non-
therapeutic research allows for negotiations to occur from organisations carrying out 
medical research and grants them a varied degree of interpretative license. Ratification 
of the first version of the Declaration of Helsinki and the subsequent amendments in 
2008 that followed resulted in a poorer demarcation of therapeutic research and non-
therapeutic research. This had an impact on research practices and the context on the 
efforts to obtain and maintain credibility and legitimacy to perform research with human 
subjects, particularly in the case of the boundary between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research. Different sectors such as the scientific human research practices, 
regulatory bodies and research ethics committees will face greater debate on defining 
the boundaries between therapeutic and non-therapeutic whilst other groups may make 
the document workable in a strategic manner.  
 
2.4 A History of Clinical Research Involving Children  
  
2.4.1 Lessons from Nuremberg 
The previous section notes the lack of a clear distinction between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic research, and that both forms of research continue to be conducted in 
infants who lack capacity. This section explores the history of how clinical research 
evolved to include children. The 1947 Nuremberg Code37 stated that voluntary consent 
is a requirement in clinical research studies, emphasising that consent can be voluntary 
only if research participants are able to consent, they are free from any coercion and that 
they comprehend the risks and benefits of research participation. The Code also states 
that “researchers should minimise risk and harm, and to ensure that such risks do not 
significantly outweigh potential benefits, use appropriate study designs, and guarantee 
participants’ freedom to withdraw at any time”.38 Prior to the Nuremberg Code, there 
was no universally accepted code of conduct governing the conduct and ethical aspects 
of human research. The code was a result of unethical clinical experimentation on war-
                                                 
37 ‘The Nuremberg code’, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (1991) 19(3-4): 266. 
38 Ibid. 
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time prisoners during World War II.39 In World War II in Germany, human hypothermia 
experiments were conducted with unwilling civilians, many whom were children. 
Scientific data was carefully recorded and noted and such experiments occurred with the 
support of the German government at the time.40 The ethical dilemma arises of whether 
such data should be used and the implications of using such data became a discussion 
point. Should the data be referenced as they were in the past or should they be destroyed 
forever? For scientists, some would argue that the questions are irrelevant as the data 
was gathered from the culmination of a scientific inquiry by a government at the time. 
Researchers from all over the world have used and referenced the Dachau hypothermia 
experimentation data since its discovery in 1946.41 Regardless of the motivation, the 
data remained valid in its scientific inquiry and was not found to be erroneous. To use 
such data in today’s scientific domain would reinforce the Nazi philosophy that there is 
a differential value amongst human beings. The argument is that the data in any form 
should not be used in any sort of scientific benchmarking as this would imply that the 
human subjects who died from these experiments were merely physiological entities in a 
research study. The appropriateness of using such unethical data continues to be debated 
and to this day, some of the data from Dachau had been extrapolated for use in 
hypothermia cooling for the treatment of infants and neonates with hypoxic-ischemic 
encephalopathy to reduce neurodisability.42 The controversy on whether one should 
even use data in any form based on the ethical arguments would suggest that a scientist 
is only influenced by his or her own personal ethical viewpoint. If scientists pursue the 
kinds of research conducted based on personal philosophies without ethical 
considerations, then how do we stop them from exploiting human subjects to advance 
their scientific understanding or knowledge? Ethics and the law will remain the only 
guidepost for scientists and researchers to conduct appropriate research. 
 
2.4.2 Declaration of Helsinki 
As noted earlier in this chapter, in 1964 the Declaration of Helsinki established a 
statement of ethical principles to provide guidance to physicians and other participants 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunal. Part 3. (His Majesty's Stationary 
Office, London, 1946). 
42 Pfister RH and Soll RF. (2010) 'Hypothermia for the treatment of infants with hypoxic-ischemic 
encephalopathy', Journal of Perinatology, 30: suppl 4. 
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in biomedical research involving human subjects.43 The Declaration serves to bind 
researchers and physicians with the statement “the health of my patient will be my first 
consideration” and declares that “a physician shall act only in the patient’s interests 
when providing medical care which may have the effect of weakening the physical and 
mental condition of the patient”. It was established to supplement and correct the 
perceived deficiencies within the Nuremberg Code with particular reference to 
physician-led research and patients. The Declaration of Helsinki was adopted44 and went 
further than the Nuremberg principles in the respect owed to each individual in medical 
research, and that the well-being of the human subject must take precedence over the 
interests of society and science. Further revisions of the Declaration of Helsinki in 1975, 
1983, 1989, 1996, 2000 and 2008 were published and permit the participation of 
children in research with parents making the decision to consent on behalf of the child. 
The Declaration also governs international research ethics and defines rules related to 
research in human subjects. The purpose of any biomedical research involving human 
participants must be to improve diagnostic, therapeutic and interventional procedures 
understanding the aetiology and pathogenesis of the disease. The Declaration, however, 
remains silent on how its principles relate to research involving infants, the growing 
recognition of infants’ rights and that their best interests and perspectives should also be 
taken into account.  
 
2.4.3 Research Changes towards Involving Children in Recent Years 
In 1963 the British Medical Association (BMA)45 in the UK stated that all 
children can participate in therapeutic research, but children younger than 12 years were 
not permitted to participate in non-therapeutic research. In the 1990s, there were 
advocates for children’s voices to be heard and for children’s opinions to be sought in 
any matter that involves them.46 The focus was then on research in older children who 
had the capacity and understanding to articulate their views. In 1991, revised guidelines 
were issued by the BMA and British Paediatric Association (BPA) stating that research 
participation by children that does not directly benefit the child was not necessarily 
                                                 
43 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
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44 Ibid. Ethical research on human subjects must be conducted under the provisions of this declaration. 
45 British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today: The BMA Handbook of Ethics and Law, 138. 
46 Rainer M. (1992) ‘Children’s voices, adults’ choices: children’s rights to legal representation’, Family 
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unethical or illegal.47 In the USA during the 1980s, the AIDS drug trials involved 
participation of children and the debate for access to child subjects and equity to 
potentially lifesaving medication evolved to permit greater access to using children as 
research subjects.48 The last two decades represented a considerable shift in favour of 
including children as research subjects for drug trials, potentially exposing children to 
risks without providing direct benefits.49 Until two decades ago, children were not 
allowed to be participants of drug research trials simply because they were perceived to 
be incapable of consent and were therefore vulnerable to abuse from drug trials.50 The 
current international, European and domestic legal framework permits and provides 
guidance for research in children but, as explored in the next chapter, there remains a 
gap in the current ethical and legal regulatory framework on its application of infants in 
research. 
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CHAPTER 3: AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A range of instruments enacted across an array of regulatory levels provide the 
framework for research involving children. These include international treaties such as 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), European Union (EU) 
legislation that is automatically applicable and therefore binding at domestic level, and 
the common law of tort.  
The medical societies and research ethics committees have produced research 
and ethical guidance on infants and children which is non-binding, and critical care 
decision making in fetal and neonatal medicine have also been established by the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party to provide advice on the ethical, social 
and legal issues that arise in critical care of fetuses and infants.51 
 This chapter addresses each theme of the regulatory framework which makes up 
our current research and ethical framework. The chapter will show that although the 
current framework discusses aspects of research in children and how decisions are made 
on behalf of a fetus or a baby, none of the current guidance or framework is specific to 
research involving infants, exposing a significant regulatory gap for this vulnerable 
group of research subjects. 
 
3.1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
 
3.1.1 Overview of the CRC  
The CRC was devised to set out a comprehensive legal and ethical framework 
related to the rights of the child. It is the most widely ratified international convention in 
existence and it remains a significant document in placing obligations on States 
signatories to comply with, and to ensure that the domestic or common law reflects its 
position. It contains an extensive reference of rights, which includes civil and political, 
social, economic, cultural, recreational and humanitarian rights.52 The CRC assumes 
that children’s rights are universal regardless of age and it applies to all people under the 
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age of 18 and the UK qualified this to include all children from birth to 18 years old.53 
The CRC is accompanied by a series of ‘General Comments’ (GCs) relating to specific 
provisions which offer detailed guidance on how they should be interpreted and applied. 
While the Comments are not legally binding, they are widely regarded as authoritative.54 
This chapter will focus on the GCs relating to Articles 3, 5, 6, 7 and 24 as a source of 
how these principles may be used to underpin the issues related to research involving 
infants. 
 
3.1.2 Best Interests of the Child 
Article 3, paragraph 1, of the CRC contains a core principle which states that: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by the public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
 
The term “best interests” remains a key principle on which decisions relating to 
medical research involving infants are often based. It is important therefore, to consider 
the origins of this concept in legal terms by using the “best interests” test and applying it 
to research involving infants.55 It is argued that research cannot be taken as solely based 
on the best interests of the individual alone, but rather a more relational approach 
towards public health is required.56 It imposes a duty on states to ensure that children 
receive protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. Article 3 of the CRC 
gives the child the right to have his or her best interests assessed and taken into account 
as a primary consideration in all actions or decisions that concern him or her, both in the 
public and private sphere.57 It is recognised that children have interests that require 
protection while they are incapable of taking care of themselves and that others should 
have that responsibility to do so. The best interests principle is not a right in itself: it is 
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used in order to implement rights in relation to a particular child and it informs the 
interpretation of other rights and constitutes one of the four general principles of the 
Convention.58 Rights are therefore interpreted and given effect in accordance with the 
infant’s best interests.59 It is also a guiding principle for those involved in developing 
law and policy which affect children. This provision is particularly relevant in the 
context of decision-making for infants involving research because there is no specific or 
explicit guidance within the CRC on infants and research. The problems with applying 
the best interests test to research involving infants cannot always be an individual 
assessment and there are circumstances where a more utilitarian approach has to be 
adopted. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
3.1.3 Children as Right Holders 
The human rights approach operates indiscriminately, thereby rejecting the idea 
that a person must have certain characteristics to have rights.60 Donnelly states that 
human rights are the rights one has simply by virtue of being human.61 The source of 
human rights is man’s moral nature as opposed to man’s capabilities.62 Freeman also 
states that being a rights-holder “is not dependent on actual autonomy, rather on the 
capacity for it”.63 Therefore, if this theory holds, both neonates and infants should also 
have individual human rights, even though they do not have any autonomy and by 
themselves are unable to exercise or claim their rights. Others would debate whether 
children should have the same kind of rights as adults or whether their rights should be 
qualified or enlarged to take into account the specific aspects of childhood such as the 
need for support and care while they are developing physically, emotionally and 
intellectually.64 These issues are of relevance because research is being carried out on 
infants who cannot assent and yet there is so little concentration on any guidance to 
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enable infants to participate in research. Article 6 of the CRC states that “every child has 
the right to life and that States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child”.65 The CRC also highlights the importance of 
thinking of young children as rights holders and independent persons worthy of respect. 
In General Comment no.7 - Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood - it states:  
 
The Convention requires that children, including the very youngest children, be 
respected as persons in their own right. Young children should be recognised as 
active members of families, communities and societies, with their own concerns, 
interests and points of view. 66  
 
3.1.4 Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health  
Article 24 of the Convention recognises the right of the child to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of health, as well as the right to facilities for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of health. Participation in clinical research involving infants is an 
important means of promoting the health, progress and well-being of the infant. Infants 
born at prematurity have different physiology from older children and preterm delivery 
leads to some unique complications. Non-therapeutic research projects such as those 
that include systematic investigations of disease processes, research into childhood 
development, aetiology of diseases in infancy, and careful scrutiny of diagnosing, 
assessing and treating disease in infants are just as important to validate with research. 
Research that is therapeutic becomes worthwhile in infants if there are identifiable 
prospects of benefit to the child and if the research is well designed and well conducted 
according to ethical and legal guidelines. The Convention makes it clear that in all 
actions affecting children, a child-centred approach must be taken and the child must be 
recognised as an independent rights-holder. Infants therefore clearly benefit from CRC 
rights to protection from abuse, neglect, harm and discrimination.  
 
3.1.5 Parents as Decision Makers 
As infants cannot participate in decisions, it is important that those who make 
decisions for them have the best interests standard as their guiding framework. Article 5 
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of the CRC requires States to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents 
and other family members as provided for by local custom to present appropriate 
direction and guidance to children in their best interests. Thus, the role of the principle is 
to aid those who make decisions for children, such as parents. Parents therefore are 
entrusted with the primary responsibility to ensure a child’s best interests and should a 
conflict arise between a child’s rights to protectionism and parental interests, then in 
some cases outside intervention will be required that is upheld by the courts. It may be 
argued that a conflict of interest may arise between what is truly a child’s best interests 
and what is the best interests of the parent or family unit and Family courts have made 
decisions based on a balancing of probabilities of what they think is the best interests of 
the child.67 For example, if parents choose to relocate to a different place or city due to 
better job prospect offered, at the time it may not be in the best interests of the child who 
would be uprooted from an environment in which he/she has been thriving, to 
disconnect with friends and other relatives as a result of the relocation. Yet, the counter-
argument would be that it would be for the best interests of the family unit including the 
child if the better job prospects will lead to an improved standard of living and better 
future prospects in education for the child. Such interpretations of best interests are 
often taken in a relational view as in many contexts, in acknowledgement of the 
interdependency of members of the family, but also to allow parents to make more 
speculative decisions, based on what they feel will benefit their children in the longer 
term.  
A human rights approach is particularly relevant in the context of medical 
research. We are compelled to recognise all infants as a rights-holder and, as such, be 
able to protect them from approaches which could result in the sacrifice of their best 
interests for the sake of good scientific progress. Their rights have an instrumental role 
in shaping the means and processes by which policies are developed to uphold human 
rights.68 Interestingly, Tobin argues that the aim of the human rights approach is to 
“insulate rights-holder from claims based on principles of utility, which otherwise 
would not only be appropriate, but decisive, reasons for public or private action”. He 
discusses a broader issue of adapting a rights-based approach. Tobin also states that: 
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This broader role and value of human rights is a critical feature of a rights based 
approach. It required a vision of human rights that extends beyond recognition of 
their legal status to an understanding that such standards embody a particular 
system of ethical demands that are designed to inform, assist constrain and direct 
the actions of those actors which have the capacity to impact on the rights of 
other actors.69 
 
This principle is further re-iterated again in Article 18, which sets it out in 
stronger terms, and states that "parents or legal guardians have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the 
child will be their basic concern". The CRC therefore allows for parents to act as proxy 
to safeguard the welfare of infants in the decisions that they make, which is not 
antipathetic to the children’s rights. The important role for parental responsibilities and 
parental decision making in the context of infants’ participation in research will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1.6 CRC Principles in Relation to Infants and Research 
The CRC, in its vast catalogue of children’s rights, does not make it clear where 
the boundaries lie with the rights of infants in the decision making process for medical 
research participation.70 The concept of the child’s best interests is aimed at ensuring 
both the full and effective enjoyment of all the rights recognized in the Convention and 
the holistic development of the child, and the Committee has already pointed out that 
“an adult’s judgment of a child’s best interests cannot override the obligation to respect 
all the child’s rights under the Convention”.71 In Article 3, it is clear that there is no 
hierarchy of rights in the Convention: all the rights provided for therein are in the 
“child’s best interests” and no right could be compromised by a negative interpretation 
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of the child’s best interests. Infants have as much rights as older children in their role 
towards medical research and towards attaining the highest standard of health. Article 6 
of the CRC states that “every child has the right to life and that States Parties shall 
ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child”.72 
This can be interpreted as being pro-research towards infants’ participation in ensuring 
health, development and medicines for infants continues to improve and progress. 
Articles 3 CRC, however, appears to go against the practice of involving infants in 
research where it cannot be proven to be in their individual best interests, nor can the 
infant express any view in the matters of the research that involves them. How can we 
reconcile these dilemmas towards infants’ participation in research? 
 
Clinical trials in infants are continuing today and consent is being given solely 
by the mother or legal guardian. Researchers have argued that recent legislation has 
made it impossible to carry out appropriate research in children and infants even when 
there is a direct benefit for this group of patients.73 It is interesting to note that with the 
advancement of children’s rights there has been a change in terminology within the 
entire discourse of children’s rights more generally. The CRC, for instance, refers to 
rights, responsibilities and duties of states, parents and families. In the past - and to 
some extent today - the term ‘parental power’ was commonly used in Welsh and 
English case law that dealt with parents, their children and the law. Parental power was 
defined as the “complex of rights, powers, duties and responsibilities vested in or 
imposed upon parents, by virtue of their parenthood, in respect of the minor child”.74 It 
is also important to note that the Convention does not make any specific reference to the 
issue of the involvement of infants or children in medical research and there are clear 
limitations from the framework as an authoritative guide to the conduct of infants in 
research and how it should be carried out.75 However, the regulation and guidance on 
the involvement of medical research involving infants may be measured by the 
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catalogue of rights within the CRC which can be used as benchmarks. For example, best 
interests of infants can be negotiated through parents or the family unit, and there are 
provisions from the CRC to support this theory. Parents are also used as proxy to the 
decision-making involved in infants’ participation in research which will be further 
explored in the next chapter.  
 
3.2 Good Clinical Practice and European Union Legislation 
 
Good Clinical Practice (GCP) is a European standard governing design, conduct, 
recording and reporting of clinical trials. The EU is now having an increasing influence 
on ethical and legal standards in the UK, having introduced harmonised standards in the 
way of legislative provision coupled with guidance to promote good practice. This 
therefore imposes a new layer of obligations above and beyond what exists nationally 
and sits alongside the accompanying international framework. The legal framework in 
the UK for conducting clinical research was prepared under Directive 2001/20/EC, the 
European Union Clinical Trials Directive (EUCTD).76 The EUCTD established specific 
provisions for the conduct of clinical trials and implementation of the GCP.77 The 
EUCTD was later transposed into UK domestic law as the Medicines for Human Use 
(Clinical Trials) Regulations on the 1st May 2004 (SI 2004/1031). The Medicines for 
Human Use (Clinical Trials) Amendment Regulations (SI 2006/1928) came into force 
on 29 August 2006 to incorporate the GCP Directives.78 The Regulations offer 
additional protection for a minor - that is, a person under the age of 16 years - who is 
being considered for a clinical trial but does not cover non-therapeutic research.79 The 
Regulations also infer that medicinal trials may be lawfully conducted if “the clinical 
trial relates directly to a clinical condition from which the minor suffers or is of such a 
nature that it can only be carried out on minors and some direct benefit for the group of 
                                                 
76 EU Clinical Trials Directive (2006) at Www.Wctn.Org.Uk/Downloads/Eu_Directive/Directive.Pdf 
77Good Clinical Practice 2013 at  
www.mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medicines/Inspectionandstandards/GoodClinicalPractice/index.htm, 
accessed April 15th 2013. 
78 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations at Www.Uk-
Legislation.Hmso.Gov.Uk/Si/SI.2004/1031,  accessed 3rd January 2013. 
79 EU Clinical Trials Directive (2006) cover only investigations/studies which are undertaken to ascertain 
the efficacy or safety of a medicine in human subjects. Non-interventional trials or non-therapeutic 
research are excluded from the Regulations. 
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patients involved in the clinical trial is to be obtained from that trial”.80 Although there 
is no precise definition on ‘non-therapeutic’ research, as discussed earlier, it is often 
taken to mean research which does not offer any clinical benefit to the research subjects. 
The provision of the Regulations appears to allow research within its remit to be carried 
out even if it offers no potential benefit to infants enrolled. There is, however, no 
reference to the degree of acceptable risk and there is no definition of what ‘direct 
benefit’ means within the Regulations. 
 
This comes at a time when more children are expected to be asked to participate 
in clinical trials as part of an international initiative to provide medicines for children 
that are fully licensed. The regulations specify that for a minor to participate in a clinical 
trial, a person with parental responsibility or a legal representative must give informed 
consent and may withdraw the young person at any time.81 In the UK, all clinical trials 
involving medicinal products must now include stringent internal regulation and adhere 
closely to these guidelines. These changes, which were instituted between 2004 and 
2006, were amended and further developed to ensure the integrity of the scientific value 
of clinical research and its conduct.82 
 
The development of the GCP and the extensive amendments caused considerable 
dissatisfaction in the academic sector. The perception was that the high level of 
regulation and increased phamacovigilance (that is, drug safety) resulted in increased 
bureaucracy which has impeded the conduct of a trial. Meeting all the new regulatory 
requirements was outside the present experience of even experienced triallists. Lack of 
support for clinical scientists and investigators may be obstacles to starting new trials 
and encouraging research amongst non-academic clinicians, whose participation and 
good will is vital to the success of any clinical trial.83 This is particularly important as a 
number of triallists have reported the impact of administrative burdens imposed to the 
EU Clinical Trials Directive resulting in failures of individual trials.84 Prior to the 
                                                 
80 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, see Regulation 15 and Part 1 of 
Schedule 4, para 9 and 10). 
81 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, see Regulation 15 and Part 1 of 
Schedule 4). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ng SM and Weindling M., see n72. 
84 Hanning CD and Rentowl P. (2006) ‘Harmful impact of EU clinical trials directive: trial of alerting 
drug in fibromyalgia has had to be abandoned’, BMJ, 332(7542):666. 
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legislation, research involving marketed products and not intended to generate results 
for marketing authorisation purposes was exempt from these rules.85 Now, with the 
current legislation, all research involving humans and any medicinal products is covered 
by the legislation. Publicly funded research must also fulfil the same requirements as 
commercially funded research. The sponsors of research studies are responsible for the 
conduct, design, recording and reporting of the research according to GCP standards.86  
 
 Prior to 2000, the situation in Europe had not supported paediatric studies. The 
paucity of paediatric research was recognised by the EU and resolutions and proposals 
were made in the form of incentives, regulatory and supportive measures in respect of 
clinical research and development to ensure that new products for children and 
medicinal products that were already available were fully adapted to the needs of 
children.87 There were also requirements that new medicinal and authorised medicinal 
products, covered by patent or supplementary protection certificates, presented results of 
studies in children according to an agreed code of practice.88 The approach towards 
amendments in 2004 and 2006 were in line with professional and international guidance. 
However, it is noteworthy that none of the guidelines appear supportive of non-
therapeutic research. Yet, multiple trials involving infants and non-therapeutic research 
are being conducted today and grants continue to be awarded to increase research 
activity in infants and neonates.89 For example, I have been involved in assisting in 
developing the protocol for the TINN study. TINN - Treat Infections in Neonates - is a 
comprehensive drug study evaluating the safety of ciprofloxacin and how it is tolerated 
by infants. Ciprofloxacin is an antibiotic that has been used for many years in newborn 
infants and infants less than 3 months old to treat bacteria that are resistant to other 
antibiotics. Ciprofloxacin is unlicensed for this age group and the European Medicines 
Agency have prioritised research funding for this drug.90 The TINN project aims to 
study pharmacodynamics, safety and side-effects of Ciprofloxacin used to treat infants. 
                                                 
85 Watson M. (2006) ‘Harmful impact of EU clinical trials directive’, BMJ, 332(7542): 666. 
86 The sponsors are also required to develop a set of operational procedures to cover all areas of research 
activities and a quality system has to be put in place to ensure record keeping of data from case report 
forms and is required to capture incidence of adverse events, serious adverse events or unexpected serious 
adverse reactions from subjects and report these in a timely manner. 
87 MacDonald A, The Right of the Child: Law and Practice (Bristol, Jordan Publishing, 2011), 24. 
88 EU Clinical Trials Directive (2006) at Www.Wctn.Org.Uk/Downloads/Eu_Directive/Directive.Pdf 
89 Ibid. 
90 TINN Pharmacokinetics (PK) Study Treat Infections in Neonates (TINN-PK) (2011) ClinicalTrials.gov 
Identifier: NCT01319435 available at //clinicaltrials.gov/show/NCT01319435. 
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The research subjects have bloods taken which are anonymised and the dosing effects 
are studied. It may be argued that although there are no specific benefits to the research 
subjects who participate, there may be some direct benefit if, for example, safety 
profiles were determined within the study and dosing were altered for all infants as a 
result of the study. The TINN study falls within the remit of the Clinical Trials 
Regulations in as much as medicinal trials may be lawfully conducted if there is some 
direct benefit for the group of patients involved in the clinical trial.91 The Medical 
Research Council (MRC)92 also stated that “research should only include children where 
the relevant knowledge cannot by obtained by research in adults” and, further, that non-
therapeutic research “is permissible on incompetent children where the children do not 
object or appear to object in either words or action”. This would mean that infants 
should be allowed to participate in non-therapeutic research that offers them no 
individual benefit but could benefit future populations as a whole. However, the 
argument for a utilitarian approach by which the individual’s interests is subservient to 
those of a wider society and used as a means to an end remains controversial. 
 
3.2.1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 The role of the EU in promoting ethical research on infants is also referenced in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.93 Specifically, Article 1 states that 
“human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected”. Further, Article 3 
states that:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. 
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in 
particular: 
                                                 
91 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, see Regulation 15 and Part 1 of 
Schedule 4, para 9 and 10). 
92 Medical Research Council, Ethics Guide: Research Involving Children (2004) at 
www.cardiff.ac.uk/optom/resources/Medical%20research%20involving%20children.pdf , accessed June 
2013. 
93 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European UN [2010/C 83/02] Note: This Charter has the same 
legal status as the EU treaties now so states have to comply with it in the implementation of their EU 
obligations. This is important as it does not create free-standing enforceable rights in the absence of 
implementing EU legislation.  
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(a) the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the 
procedures laid down by law; 
(b) the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the 
selection of persons; 
(c) the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of 
financial gain; 
(d) the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.  
 
 Article 1 and Article 3 are therefore significant as they refer to infants’ rights to 
respect and integrity in the way that any research should be conducted. It also 
specifically refers to the fields of medicine in that informed consent should be sought, 
but it does clarify areas where individuals who are non-competent are dependent on 
their guardians for such protection. 
  
 Articles 24 and 35 of the Charter94 allude to the fact that children have the right 
to all forms of protection and care for their well-being and that their best interests is of 
primary consideration in any decisions made. Parents and guardians have the 
responsibility for their child’s best interests and the role of such a principle is to aid 
those who make decisions for the infants in any area such as research or healthcare. 
Mnookin and Szwed argued that “what is best for any child or even children in general 
is often indeterminate and speculative, and requires a highly individualised choice 
between alternatives”.95 Thus, the best interests test is often criticised as it is believed 
that, since there is no definition of the principle, or guidance in its application, the 
values of the particular decision-maker may influence decisions.96 
 
 It is debatable whether these codes of practice provide adequate and appropriate 
standards of conduct when transposed to the ethics of conducting research on infants. 
Although the GCP and global human rights principles contain rather specific statements 
                                                 
94 In Article 24 Rights of the child refers to “Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is 
necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into 
consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity, and Article 35 on 
Healthcare states that "Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit 
from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices”. 
95 Mnookin R and Szwed E, (eds.) The Best Interests Syndrome and the Allocation of Power in Child 
Care, Providing Civil Justice for Children (London, Providing Civil Justice for Children, 1983), 55. 
96 Ibid. 
39 
 
on how research should be conducted or how consent should be taken, it does not 
address the specific issues of infants’ participation in research and such statements 
remain too abstract to be able to resolve any specific cases in this category of a 
population that is vulnerable and non-competent. A pertinent issue is that they cannot be 
enforced independently, and that they must be integrated into binding law in order to 
have any real effect. It remains clear that there is a gap in the current international 
framework which does not address the issues posed by research involving infants. 
 
3.3 Common Law of Negligence 
 
The law of negligence seeks to ensure that as individuals we are responsible for 
our actions and that we consider those who might be injured by those acts and 
omissions. The modern law of negligence was established in Donoghue v Stevenson. 97 
In order to be successful in a negligence claim, the claimant must prove the defendant 
owed them a duty of care, that the defendant was in breach of that duty, that the breach 
of duty caused damage and that the damage was not too remote.98 The duty of care 
requires health professionals, including researchers, to consider the consequences of any 
acts and omissions and to ensure that those acts and/or omissions do not give rise to 
significant foreseeable risks of injury. However there are limitations of the law of 
negligence as a means of protecting research subjects and providing any guidance for 
medical researchers. There is a need to prove that damage is caused by negligence and, 
in the context of research, legally it is difficult to prove that the research intervention 
and not the subject’s underlying condition or illness had ‘caused’ the harm. The 
standard of care clinicians are required to meet is known as the Bolam test, following 
the Bolam case,99 which refers to the reasonable opinion of a body of professional men. 
                                                 
97 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought 
her a bottle of ginger beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that the contents 
could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the bottle over her ice cream and also drank 
some from the bottle. After eating part of the ice cream, she then poured the remaining contents of the 
bottle over the ice cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs Donoghue suffered 
personal injury as a result. She commenced a claim against the manufacturer of the ginger beer. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 is an English tort law case that 
lays down the typical rule for assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care in negligence cases 
involving skilled professionals. Case Summary- Mr Bolam was a voluntary patient at a mental health 
institution run by the Friern Hospital Management Committee. He agreed to undergo electro-convulsive 
therapy. He was not given any muscle relaxant, and his body was not restrained during the procedure. He 
flailed about violently before the procedure was stopped, and he suffered some serious injuries, including 
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The Bolam test concludes that if a doctor reaches the standard of a responsible body of 
medical opinion, he is not negligent. This was later modified by Bolitho to indicate a 
decision must also stand up to logical scrutiny.100 This case illustrates how the law of 
negligence has limitations as a framework for regulating research involving infants. The 
standard of care established in the Bolam test has made it notoriously difficult for 
claimants to succeed in negligence claims.99 However, we can transpose these principles 
into research conduct in infants such that all researchers and doctors have a duty of care 
to fully inform parents of any possible risk of harm when enrolling their infants into 
research.101 In fact, at one time, it was regarded as giving the medical profession 
something close to immunity but the Bolitho modification has changed this. A claim in 
negligence is only available where there is damage, but there are very few if any 
cases102 which deal specifically with the standards of care applicable to a clinical 
researcher such that the guidance offered by the tort of negligence is at a very abstract 
level.  
 
3.4 Mental Capacity Act 
 
Prior to the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, any physical intervention without 
the consent of the adult was lawful only if it was in the person’s best interests. In Re F, 
                                                                                                                                               
fractures of the acetabula. He sued the Committee for compensation. He argued they were negligent for 
not issuing relaxants, not restraining him and not warning him about the risks involved. 
100 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771. The claimant’s son was admitted 
into the hospital for respiratory difficulties and was placed under the care of Doctor Horn. Doctor Horn 
did not see the patient when the nurse had called her, and on a second occasion, the doctor delegated the 
care to another doctor, her junior, Doctor Rodger. This doctor also did not see the claimant’s son. This led 
to further complications in the patient and then severe brain damage from which he eventually died. The 
defendants argued based on the Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee case that their decision 
not to have intubated him earlier could be confirmed by a reliable and respectable body of opinion. 
101 Both Bolam and Bolitho’s case concern the standard of care when it has been alleged that the doctor 
was negligent in the treatment given or not given to the patient. In Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
[1985] AC 871, C had an operation performed where there was an inherently small 2% risk that it could 
lead to spinal damage, even if the surgery was performed properly. C ended up severely disabled as a 
result of complications of the surgery and sued the hospital and deceased surgeon. The surgeon told C that 
there was a chance of disturbing the nerve during the surgery but did not disclose the small risk about the 
possibility of damage to her spinal cord. However, the Court found that the hospital and surgeon were not 
liable to pay for personal injury caused to Ms Sidaway since she had not proved on the evidence that the 
surgeon had been in breach of duty by failing to warn her of that risk. 
102 In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 801, 812: “Where the doctor embarks on a 
form of treatment which is still comparatively untried, with techniques and safeguards which are still in 
the course of development, or where the treatment is of particular technical difficulty, if the decision to 
embark on the treatment at all was justifiable and was taken with the informed consent of the patient, the 
court should in my judgment, be particularly careful not to impute negligence simply because something 
has gone wrong” (per Mustill LJ). This case provides some detail on how the courts might approach the 
standard of care required of a researcher working at the frontier of knowledge. 
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the courts authorised full sterilisation to be performed on a severely mentally disabled 
woman who had sexual relationships with a fellow patient as there were concerns that 
she would not be able to cope with a pregnancy.103 The procedure was declared to be 
lawful on the grounds that it was in her best interests. The principle of best interests 
applied in this case persists, but it now has a statutory status.104  
 
 The MCA provides a statutory framework for people who may not be able to 
make their own decisions because of, for example, learning difficulties, brain injury or 
mental health problems. The Act sets out who can take decisions, in which situations, 
and how they should go about this.105 However, the MCA is relevant only to research 
involving adults over the age of 16106 in England and Wales, except Clinical Trials of 
Investigational Medicinal Products (CTIMPs)107 and provides the legal arrangements to 
enable adults lacking capacity to consent to take part in therapeutic research other than 
CTIMPs (including health and social care research) that would otherwise require the 
participant’s consent. The MCA regulates research on those lacking capacity but it 
cannot be applied to research on children.108 Nevertheless, presumably the courts would 
refer in part to the principles of the MCA in any given dispute about research involving 
children and infants who also lack capacity, therefore it is useful to examine how the 
MCA bears on the issue of whether non-therapeutic research on infants could be lawful.  
 
The legality of non-therapeutic research involving adults, although widely 
supported by research communities and by medical advisory colleges, remains 
uncertain. The MCA clarifies and supplements the common law in relation to research 
involving those who are over 16 and who lack capacity. However, it does not clearly 
distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research and the Act remains 
limited in its scope and does not apply to the testing of new drugs.109 None of the 
                                                 
103 Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
104 See Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 4. 
105 See Appendix.  
106 The MCA Act section 2(5) states that the Act does not authorise powers to be exercisable in respect of 
under 16s and therefore the MCA does not apply to children younger than 16 who do not have capacity.  
107 The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 make legal provision for 
participation in CTIMPs by adults lacking capacity to consent. 
108 In the MCA sections 30-33, the Act provide lawful authority for research to be carried out in adults (16 
years and older) without capacity provided that the research has been approved by an appropriate body. 
109 In the MCA Sections 30-33 of the Act provide lawful authority for intrusive research to be carried out. 
Under Section 30 of the Act, research is intrusive if it is of a kind that would be unlawful if it was carried 
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current legislative frameworks refers specifically to infants and this is an area that 
remains uncertain, particularly in the area of non-therapeutic research. The MCA section 
31(5) states that the research must have the potential to benefit the research subject 
without imposing a disproportionate burden and it must be intended to provide insight 
into the treatment, care or causes of the condition which the research subject is affected 
by. In section 31(6) the Act also states that any research that falls within the remit of 
section 31(5), there must be reasonable grounds to believe that anything done to the 
research subject must not be unduly invasive or restrictive.110 
 
If the MCA’s principles are applied to the issue of whether we could conduct 
research involving infants and children who lack capacity, we can infer that research can 
also be conducted in infants who lack capacity even if the research does not directly 
benefit the infants but may be connected to the condition the infants may be suffering as 
long as it is not unduly invasive. It can be further extrapolated that all forms of consent 
lie with the parents or guardians, relying on parental responsibilities and their judgement 
to make a decision on whether or not to consent to their infant’s involvement in 
research.  
 
None of the regulatory frameworks, principles or guidance described can be 
specifically related to the conduct of research involving infants and huge gaps in the 
guidance, knowledge and perspectives are noted. It remains controversial as to whether 
infants are justified in their participation to research for the benefit of the greater good if 
there is no direct benefit to the individual infant. It is further argued with the increasing 
number of research studies involving infants, should infants be protected from the 
inevitable discomfort and risks from blood samplings when recruited into clinical trials 
and how can this be regulated?111 If the overarching principle lies in that the interests of 
                                                                                                                                               
out “on or in relation to a person who had capacity to consent to it, but without this consent”. Therefore 
intrusive research means research that would legally require consent if it involved people with capacity. 
Intrusive research is not limited to trials of clinical interventions. It includes non-interventional research 
where consent is legally required, for example involving the processing of personal data or the 
administration of questionnaires, interviews or observations. Under Section 30 of the MCA, clinical trials 
of investigative medicinal products are specifically excluded from the research provisions of the Act. This 
is because separate provision is made for including adults lacking capacity in Schedule 1 of the Medicines 
for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004. 
110 MCA Sections 31(5) and 31 (6). 
111 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations at Www.Uk-
Legislation.Hmso.Gov.Uk/Si/SI.2004/1031, accessed 3rd January 2013. 
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the infant must prevail over all other interests of science and society, then any non-
therapeutic research involving infants should be challenged. However, research with 
adults cannot simply be generalised or extrapolated to infants and this chapter has 
argued that there is a niche required for research in the infants’ population that is 
essential. The current body of law that has been described thus far remains 
underdeveloped with regards to research involving infants. The implications of the 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 which requires proof of a 
‘direct positive benefit test’112 is considered unduly restrictive of some types of 
paediatric research which are non-therapeutic as discussed previously in Chapter 2. 
Cave argues that although children’s rights must be safeguarded, research must be 
encouraged in rare paediatric conditions where it cannot be conducted in adults.113 She 
also states that the law, which should provide a minimum standard of protection for both 
children’s rights and interests and society’s interest in the furtherance of research, is at 
times vague and contradictory.114 Research however, has enabled major improvements 
in fetal diagnosis and medical care to improve the survival of extremely premature 
infants born at the cusps of viability. In the next section, the ethical, legal and social 
issues within the context of critical care given to extremely premature infants born 
before 26 weeks’ gestation is discussed. 
 
3.5  Nuffield Council Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine  
 
Improved neonatal survival is a result of advancement in the delivery of 
intensive care given to extremely premature infants. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
developed a working party to establish a report which examines the ethical, social and 
legal issues that are related to critical care decision making in fetal and neonatal 
medicine.115 It proposes to offer guidance on decisions of whether a premature infant 
should be resuscitated or not at birth, whether further treatment should be instituted, 
withheld or continued after birth, and such decisions will undoubtedly affect whether the 
infant lives or dies. 
                                                 
112 Ibid., see Schedule 1, part 4. 
113 Cave E. (2010) ‘Seen but not heard: children in clinical trials’, Medical Law Review, 18(1): 1-27. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2006) ‘Nuffield Council Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal 
Medicine’, http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CCD-web-version-22-June-07-
updated.pdf 
44 
 
The best interests principle is central to medical practice and the Working Party 
concluded that the best interests of a baby must be a central consideration in 
determining whether and how to treat him or her.116 However, it does not appear to 
consider that the baby’s interests should invariably take precedence over the interests of 
these other parties and it is the Working Party’s view that those who make decisions in 
respect of an infant must also consider the interests of others who may be affected by 
such decisions such as other family members.117 In the case of baby Elliot discussed 
within the report, who was born at 41 weeks with severe brain injuries, was 
unresponsive and ventilator-dependent, the medical teams were in agreement that 
further life support was not justified when the prognosis was so poor. However, the 
parents believed life was sacred and did not agree to withdrawal of care. Elliot died later 
of severe infection three months later. Although health professionals chose not to 
challenge the parents, this case could have been brought to court to determine whether 
Elliot gained any benefit to life and experienced any meaningful human interaction in 
his limited life, what were the burdens to his treatment and whether he was he subject to 
pain and distress.118 In reviewing the current legal principles in the UK, is the current 
model of decision making that allows doctors and parents broad discretion to determine 
an infant’s fate sufficiently sensitive to his or her best interests? It has been 
acknowledged by the Working Party that there were real difficulties in knowing what is 
best for an infant within the context of decision making on whether to initiate, withhold 
or withdraw treatment. Parents have interests that are distinct from those of their baby, 
and health professionals may also have interests that may conflict with their ability to 
represent the best interests of the infant, but the principles of best interests of the infant 
should remain a central one in decision making about the infant and it carries the 
greatest weight. The infant’s interest in living or dying, or in avoiding an ‘intolerable’ 
life is more important than the interests that others may have in any significant decisions 
made about him or her.119 
 
It is clear that although ethical guidance currently exists in fetal and neonatal 
critical care decision making, it remains vague and there is still varying degrees of 
                                                 
116 Ibid, page 14 
117 Ibid, page 17 
118 Ibid, page 101 
119 Ibid, page 159 
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consistency in relation to decisions related to treatment withdrawal and views on quality 
of life.  In relation to the ethics of imparting clinical research, whether it is therapeutic 
or non-therapeutic, there is currently no emphasis in this Nuffield guidance on the 
practice of research in these infants. Research ethics committees thus face a difficult 
task balancing the relevant ethical factors, as is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3.6 Research Ethics Committees 
 
 In the UK, it is against the law, under the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical 
Trials) Regulations 2004, to start, recruit for or conduct a clinical trial of an 
investigational medicinal product until there is a favourable opinion from a recognised 
“Research Ethics Committee”.120 The role of ethics committees is to provide protection 
assurance to the public by reviewing in detail the research protocols, the aims and 
objectives, the suitability of investigators, the methodology and materials used, the 
documentation and consent procedures and ensuring that the overall research conducted 
is in accordance to GCP standards. Their responsibility is to ensure that the research 
participants’ rights, well-being and safety are assured when participating in any 
research.121 The ethics committee are also responsible for providing either a favourable 
or unfavourable decision on the research study. The Research Ethics Committee (REC) 
undertakes the ethical review process of an application. The research application for 
ethical review must be made by the Chief Investigator for the research study.122 
Research networks were also developed to support and coordinate high quality clinical 
research and to facilitate the conduct of research and other studies within the National 
Health Service (NHS).123 The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) 
Comprehensive Clinical Research Network (CCRN) was created in the UK as part of 
the government’s research and development strategy so named as Best Research for 
Best Health to provide a world-class infrastructure for clinical trials in all areas of 
disease and clinical need within the NHS. The NIHR CCRN works together with the six 
                                                 
120 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations at Www.Uk-
Legislation.Hmso.Gov.Uk/Si/SI.2004/1031, accessed 3rd January 2013. 
121 NHS Research Ethics Service (2009) at //www.nresform.org.uk/AppForm/display/login.asp?b=1 
[hereinafter “NHS Research Ethics Service”]. 
122 “NHS Research Ethics Service”. 
123 UK Clinical Research Network at //www.ukcrn.org.uk/index.html, accessed 1 May 2013 [hereinafter 
“UK Clinical Research Network”]. 
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Topic Specific CCRNs and a Primary Care Research Network to support a national 
portfolio of clinical trials and other studies. The Medicines for Children Research 
Network (MCRN) was established in 2006 to improve the clinical research environment 
for children with a stated aim “to facilitate the conduct of randomised prospective trials 
and other well-designed studies of medicines for children, including those for 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment”.124 A similar function is provided by CRN for 
other patient groups. If a trial involves an unlicensed medicine without the support of a 
pharmaceutical company, then a significant amount of funding and resources are 
required to conduct such a trial. There needs to be intensive input from NHS trusts or 
organisation pharmacists and the Research and Development departments to deal with 
manufacturing the investigational medicinal product (IMP), ensuring there is good 
quality control, assessor-blinding and appropriate dispensing of the treatment or placebo 
intervention.125 This requires considerable funding, resources and specialist input 
towards the trial conduct. In addition, a clinical therapeutic investigative or medicinal 
trial requires sponsors which are usually a university or an NHS trust who are solely 
responsible for the trial’s conduct, recording and reporting of adverse effects and design 
of the trial.126 Many UK research centres, professional associations and organisations 
also issue their own codes of conduct for good practice. While some set stringent 
criteria, others may have more general views and provide guidelines for codes of 
conduct rather than set absolute standards. 
 An interesting example was a randomised controlled trial BOOST-II UK trial127 
where extremely premature infants born below 28 weeks were randomly divided into 
two groups. In one group the aim was to keep the oxygen saturation level as much as 
possible in the range 85-89% and in the other group in the range 91-95%. The initial aim 
of the trial was to recruit 1200 infants but an interim analysis conducted showed that 
infants who were having their oxygen in the range 91-95% were surviving more often 
than those who were having their oxygen targeted in the range 85-89%. The research 
ethics committees and data monitoring committees asked for the trial to be stopped 
before the full recruitment target was reached as the difference between the 2 groups 
was so clear indicating a much higher risk of death in infants randomised to the lower 
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oxygen saturation range. One question that arises from this trial is whether research 
ethics committees should bear some responsibility as well as the medical profession, in 
failing to foresee such an unexpected trial result, and in turn for wrongfully randomising 
babies to receive oxygen within the accepted standard-of-care limits.  
 In the context of research involving infants, the development of research ethics 
committees and research networks such as the MCRN was aimed at facilitating research 
in children and infants in the UK. It could be said that they constitute a breach in the 
legal principle of protectionism of the infant. None of these committees or networks 
appear to have any legal binding to the law of best interests or rights to the infant that 
will be discussed in the next section.128 Yet, the current research guidelines in the UK 
promotes a view which is contrary to the individualised infants’ best interests principle 
because there is a greater good at stake and infants need to be involved and not excluded 
from research.129 
 
3.7 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health Guidance  
 
 In 2000, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) in the UK 
published guidance which indicates that research procedures that are not intended to 
directly benefit the child may not be necessarily either unethical or illegal.130 The 
guidelines stated that they were written for everyone involved in the planning, review, 
and conduct of research with children. The RCPCH’s first guidelines - then the British 
Paediatric Association - were published in 1980. Since then, there has been significant 
progress in the understanding of children’s interests, in legal requirements, and in the 
proper regulation of research. The revised guidelines take account of such developments 
and were based on the following principles:131 
 
(1) Research involving children is important for the benefit of all children and 
should be supported, encouraged and conducted in an ethical manner; 
                                                 
128 Brazier M and Cave, E. Medicine, Patients and The Law (London, Penguin, 2007). Although the 
Clinical Trials Regulations in the UK require that trials that fall within its remit must have ethical 
approval, for research that falls outside the remit of the CTA there is no legal requirement for ethics 
approval. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Child Health: Ethics Advisory Committee Royal College of Paediatrics (2000) 'Guidelines for the 
ethical conduct of medical research involving children', Archives of Disease in Childhood,  82(2): 177-82. 
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(2) Children are not small adults, and a child or infant has additional, unique set 
of interests; 
(3) Research should only be done on children if comparable research on adults 
could not answer the same question; 
(4) A research procedure which is not intended directly to benefit the child 
subject is not necessarily either unethical or illegal; 
(5) All proposals involving medical research on children should be submitted to 
a research ethics committee; and  
(6) Consent should be obtained from the child, parent or guardian as appropriate. 
When parental consent is obtained, the agreement of school age children who 
take part in research should also be requested by researchers. 
  
The RCPCH goes on to state that: 
 
Children are unique as a research group for many reasons. They are the only 
people, in British law, on whose behalf other individuals may consent to medical 
procedures. Many children are vulnerable, easily bewildered and frightened, and 
unable to express their needs or defend their interests.132 
 
Potentially with many decades ahead of them, they are likely to experience, in 
their development and education, the most lasting benefits or harms from research. The 
RCPCH also contends that: 
 
It was important to validate in children the beneficial results of research 
conducted in adults and that research with children is worthwhile if each project 
has an identifiable prospect of benefit to the child; is well designed and well 
conducted in its protocol; does not simply duplicate earlier work that has been 
published; is not undertaken primarily for financial or professional advantage; 
involves a statistically appropriate number of subjects and eventually is to be 
properly reported. 
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The RCPCH provide the closest guidance we have on research involving infants 
and expressly stipulates that research can be undertaken as long as it not “against the 
infants’ best interest”.  
 
3.8  Concluding Remarks 
 
The current legal and ethical framework and regulations governing therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic research involving infants remains vague, particularly with regard 
to protection of infants in clinical trials and within the area of non-therapeutic research 
which is an area of greatest contention concerning the infant. The law apparently does 
not appear to allow non-therapeutic research involving infants as the term non-
therapeutic research refers to research which confers no personal benefit to the infants 
and the overreaching principle is that the interests of the child must prevail over the 
interests of science and society. Should the law therefore be more explicit in its 
guidance and direction of what confers personal benefit when research is being 
undertaken? A gulf exists between what is legal and what is practised with research 
involving infants currently being promoted and conducted regardless of the law. Indeed, 
even the RCPCH available guidelines - that state “a research procedure which is not 
intended directly to benefit the child subject is not necessarily either unethical or illegal” 
- are not consistent with the legal principle of best interests and, therefore, cannot be 
applied to infants as the law still upholds the fundamental principle that if research were 
not intended to benefit the infant, then it can be considered unethical. In the absence of 
any clear legal and ethical guidance, it is felt that any authorisation would not be 
deemed to be in the infant’s best interests to be engaged in any research participation 
where he or she does not stand to gain anything personally from it. Where the courts 
have been asked to assess whether such proposed interventions are within the child’s 
best interests, they generally do not consider the wider interests of those caring for the 
child or the wider interests of society. The RCPCH took the view that provided research 
cannot be carried out in adults and an appropriate risk to benefit assessment has been 
undertaken with minimal risk and minimal harm towards the child, non-therapeutic 
research that does not necessarily benefit the infant can be deemed ethical.133 Whether 
the RCPCH, as an advisory body, can make such a claim as it merely acts as an expert 
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organisation remains arguable. There may be an ethical argument that may be mounted 
to support this contention to allow it to be permissible to conduct non-therapeutic 
research involving infants - indeed, the Clinical Trials Regulation do authorise non-
therapeutic medicinal trials involving infants subject to strict conditions134 - yet it 
remains unclear whether non-therapeutic research in children beyond medicinal 
products such as psychology or surgery interventions would be lawful. Furthermore, it 
appears to contradict what had been previously described within the global/international 
principles of human rights from the CRC, and the law is still unclear. There has been no 
case law to date to render such non-therapeutic research as lawful nor has it been proven 
as ethically justifiable. Arguably, where there is serious concern that risk may be more 
than minimal, the courts in any future case law - and in light of statutory prohibition of 
non-therapeutic research - may well be influenced such that approval will be less likely 
to be given compared to therapeutic clinical research. Quite clearly, there is a paucity of 
clear guidelines within the legal and ethical framework on the issue specific to infants 
and research. The next chapter seeks to examine how we can justify research involving 
infants based on the argument that parents have a right and responsibility to make such 
judgements when risks are minimal or negligible. 
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CHAPTER 4: PARENTAL RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY AND WHAT IS 
ACCEPTABLE RISK? 
 
 
This chapter examines the crucial issues related to how parental rights and 
responsibilities can be defined in the context of recruitment into clinical research. It 
provides a critical analysis of the issue of risk exposure when participating in research 
that has no direct benefit and then moves to consider the difficulties faced in pinning 
down what is acceptable risk in research. It will be argued that leaving decisions 
pertaining to research participation for infants to parental discretion is the only sensible 
solution.  
 
4.1 Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 
The term ‘parental rights’ has found recent disfavour within the children’s rights 
debate as such rights that exist are certainly not absolute, and this applies especially in 
the case of rights to consent or involve one’s child in research. Such a right must be 
exercised ‘responsibly’ in the best interests of the child. However, this does not mean 
that parents do not have any rights as in most jurisdictions the parents or guardians have 
legally recognised and enforceable rights of custody, and other rights that come with the 
recognition of a family life that will enable them to carry out their parental duties.135 
‘Parental responsibility’ is a term used to describe the legal duty that a parent has to 
their child.136 Having parental responsibility gives rise to the right to contribute to 
decision making regarding a child’s future and any decisions affecting their future too. 
For example, the parent has responsibilities towards their children in the area of their 
general upbringing, naming the child, providing a home for the child, deciding on their 
religious upbringing, choosing and providing the child’s education, deciding on where 
the child goes to school, and making different decisions about their child’s health, 
education, and their physical and emotional welfare. This responsibility includes 
agreeing to the child’s medical treatment, allowing confidential information about the 
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child to be disclosed and being able to give consent regarding medical treatment and 
participation in research.137 
  
In addition to the court’s statutory powers under the Children’s Act, the courts 
also have an inherent jurisdiction which enables them to make orders and decisions in 
respect of the child. The parens patriae jurisdiction has been described as an ancient 
prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown which had been delegated to the courts to protect 
the persons and properties of those who were unable to do so themselves.138 Thus, in 
dealing with children, the court acts in its parens patriae capacity in promoting and 
protecting the interests of the child in relation to medical treatment. In principle, the 
court may consider any case concerning an incompetent child under this jurisdiction. 
Although wardship was historically used as a procedure to exercise the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction, it is now rarely undertaken in medical treatment cases, except in the event 
of a dispute over a proposed course of treatment or in the absence of lawful authority to 
proceed, the courts may seek to use the inherent jurisdiction by which the courts’ 
paramount consideration must be that of the best interests of the child.139 The best 
interests principle seems to demand that there is only one solution after evaluating the 
harms and benefits to the intervention. However, a range of factors may be taken into 
account in establishing that the best interests option may be variable and that opinions 
may differ in establishing the evidence needed to determine them and the weight that 
should be given to competing factors. No matter how simply a proposition such as this 
is made, applying it in practice is not an easy task as any departure from the best 
interests consideration may be seen as lessening the importance of the child’s best 
interests. In the end, much discretion will lie with the courts as to how much and what 
factors the court is permitted to take into consideration, how it chooses to take it into 
account and how those factors are weighed up in the balance. 
 
4.2 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc 
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 There remains a paucity of examples of court judgements in the UK related to 
research protection policies in children. Although US cases have no direct bearing on 
legislation in the EU, one illustrative example may be taken from the landmark case of 
Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc (KKI)140 in the US where, for the first time, a 
court had addressed the issue of parental rights and authority in being able to consent to 
their children becoming research subjects, especially when the research is non-
therapeutic and offers no direct benefit to the child whilst imposing minimal risk. The 
court addressed the relationships of researchers and institutions that conduct non-
therapeutic research towards child subjects and further challenged the notion of 
acceptable levels of risk in paediatric research where the research participants gain no 
direct benefit.141 There were two negligence cases in which the claimants were young 
children recruited into non-therapeutic research aimed at determining the safety and 
effectiveness of different methods of lead paint abatement. The case involved 
allegations that children were put at significant risk of being exposed to lead poisoning 
as a result of participating in the research. The claimants alleged that KKI had arranged 
for some houses in the research study to have only partial lead paint abatement and had 
encouraged families with young children to stay in these houses while the children who 
were research subjects had their bloods sampled over time. It was also alleged that KKI 
was aware that one of the children’s blood samples showed a dangerously high blood 
lead level and KKI failed to notify the parents in a timely manner. It was also alleged 
that KKI did not fully provide the parents with a clear and full explanation of the 
research. Only children who were from low income households appeared to have been 
recruited as subjects in the research and questions were raised of whether parents were 
enticed by money or other items offered by KKI. The trial court granted KKI motion for 
summary judgment and finally dismissed the case, basing the judgment on the grounds 
that the KKI researchers do not have a legal duty to warn claimants of the presence of 
lead dust. The claimants appealed, stating that the court’s decision was incorrect and 
that it was a matter of law that any institution conducting non-therapeutic research must 
have a duty to warn any participant’s parent or guardian of his/her legal right to be 
aware of the dangers involved in any research undertaken, especially if the researcher 
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has any knowledge of the potential harm towards the research participant and he/she is 
unaware of the danger.142 Research communities feared that as a result all forms of 
public health research involving minors would be halted.143 
 
 The Court of Appeal later reversed the trial court’s ruling stating that the very 
nature of non-therapeutic scientific research on human subjects can and will normally 
create special relationships between researchers and recruits out of which duties arise. 
The court indicated that ‘acceptable risk’ was indicted in the context of the case as 
including “minimal risk”.144 It described the legal theories that could delineate the 
obligations of non-therapeutic researchers such as contractual obligations. The court 
held that contractual obligations exist as researchers and subjects entered an agreement 
within the consent procedures and that the consent form creates a legally binding 
agreement.145 The court specifically reserved judgement on whether contractual 
obligations are created in non-therapeutic research. The court also held that regulatory 
obligations were in place to provide a means of ensuring subjects’ rights. Moreover it 
was noted that: 
 
In the court’s view, the health of the children should not be subjects of non-
therapeutic research which has the potential to be harmful to the child. It is, first 
and foremost, the responsibility of the researcher and the research entity to see 
the harmlessness of such non-therapeutic research, and consent from the parent 
or guardian can never relieve the researcher of this duty.146 
 
The court also held that there should be restrictions to parental rights and 
authority to consent to their children’s participation of non-therapeutic research after 
noting that children are not equivalent to rats, hamsters and monkeys used in research. 
The court further stated that “parents are duty-bound to act in their children’s best 
interests and that it not in the best interests of healthy children to be intentionally put at 
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risk in non-therapeutic research where his/her health may be impaired in order to test 
methods that may be beneficial to all children in the future”.147 The argument from the 
defence was that the children as participants had, in fact, benefited in the study because 
if they had not moved into the research homes they might have ended up in other similar 
contaminated homes that were receiving no treatments.148 
 
 The Grimes case remains the only US landmark court case to explicitly address 
and argue that it was unethical to recruit children into non-beneficial research that 
offered subjects a “negative” risk/benefit profile.149 It raised legal and ethical issues 
related to the enrolment of children in non-therapeutic research projects that may 
present a risk of harm and no possibility of direct benefit to the individual child subjects. 
It also appeared to impose a requirement that all non-therapeutic research should be 
harmless and that any risk of harm must be conveyed by researchers and institutions to 
the subjects or their parents/guardians where the subjects are minors. The restrictiveness 
of this case caused concern to many research communities and institutions such as KKI 
because public health research that compares how effective a preventative intervention 
is in children is widely conducted in the public health sector. The "no-risk" standard 
imposed is considerably stricter than the accepted research regulations which permit 
research that presents with “minimal risk”.150 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s ruling that institutions and research communities do not have any obligation or 
duty to fully inform and protect research subjects. It was also correct in its ruling that 
there should be a very cautious approach toward non-therapeutic research in non-
competent subjects such as children and there are ethical obligations not to exploit 
research subjects.151 
 
 The court’s adoption of a “no risk” standard in Grimes resulted in many 
academic organisations requesting reconsideration of its ruling, arguing that such a 
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standard would prohibit any future important research. However, the court denied any 
motion for reconsideration and attempted to clarify its position: “by the term ‘any risk’, 
we meant that any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in 
any endeavour”. The statement relates to non-therapeutic research studies which have 
no direct medical benefit to the child or research subject whatsoever, so any balance 
between risk and benefit is necessarily negative.152 To reconcile the statement of the 
court above, it would appear that the court seems to permit some minimal risk but it also 
seems to convey that any risk is too great in the context of non-therapeutic research in 
children. One of the most important issues is whether it is ethical to withhold effective 
public health and environmental interventions from research subjects in order to satisfy 
scientific goals which may benefit future populations.153 
  
4.3 What is Acceptable Risk? 
 
 The problem we face is the issue of identifying what is ‘acceptable risk’, and 
what type of risk in non-therapeutic research may children be ethically or legally 
exposed to? Is there a level of acceptable risk to which we can justifiably expose infants 
to in the pursuit of non-therapeutic research? In 1996, an appellate court in New York 
heard a similar case - TD v NY - regarding non-therapeutic research involving 
incompetent research subjects.154 In that case, the claimants brought action to challenge 
the US regulations of the New York Department of Mental Health that sanctioned 
exposure to greater than minimal risk in non-therapeutic experiments on adults who lack 
capacity and on children. The court noted that “a parent or guardian may not consent to 
have a child or subject submitted to painful or potentially life threatening research 
procedures that hold no prospect of any benefit to the child and may have the same 
result as a denial of necessary medical treatment”. The claimant’s arguments had never 
been proven in this case as the trial court dismissed the case before a trial was upheld.155  
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 The KKI case and the TD case were criticised as appearing to prohibit any non-
therapeutic research from being conducted in children and infants. The courts did not 
resolve the ethical debate on whether such research involving infants may continue or be 
abolished altogether. It may be acceptable to say that parents should not submit their 
infant to harmful research procedures that offers no direct benefit to the infant. 
However, the prohibition of the court on any form of “painful” procedures may seem to 
prohibit even the act of drawing blood. This would be perceived as halting any 
meaningful research involving blood sampling.156 The US research regulations defined 
‘minimal risk’ as any situation where the probability and the magnitude of harm or 
discomfort endured or anticipated in the context of research are not therefore greater in 
and of themselves compared to those ordinarily encountered in the daily life or during a 
performance of a routine physical and psychological examination or test.157 The 
reference to daily life raises the question of whose daily life is to be used as a reference 
point. Daily lives of inner city populations are likely to be riskier than those compared 
to suburban populations, and the literal application of such a regulation would appear to 
allow ‘riskier’ research within the inner city compared to the suburbs. In further 
exploring how we can quantify the notion of acceptable risk or harm in the context of 
research, the chapter will now discuss the evidence related to perceptions of pain and 
assessments of risk. 
 
4.3.1 Perceptions of Pain and Assessment of Risk 
 There is strong evidence of a difference in age perception of pain and a 
difference between older children’s and infants’ perception of pain.158 A differential 
tolerance of pain appears to increase with age and maturity when the child no longer 
perceives medical interventions as punitive.159 A child’s or an infant’s response may be 
unpredictable and varied and may alter as they mature and develop, such that current 
generalisations and guidance on risks do not apply. One procedure may not bother one 
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infant, but may be distressing to another. The UK’s RCPCH160 recommended that 
assessment of any potential risk or harm should include estimates of types of 
intervention described in the research protocol such as: (1) how invasive or intrusive the 
research could be towards the participant and how severe may the harms associated with 
research procedures likely to be; (2) what are the probabilities of these harms occurring 
during the research period; (3) might any adverse effects be either short or long lasting, 
or may it be immediate or not evident until years later; (4) whether matters of equity are 
taken into account such as are a few children drawn into too many projects simply 
because they are available or are researchers relying unduly on children who already 
have many problems?; and (5) if evidence of harm in giving or withholding certain 
treatment emerges during the trial, how will possible conflict between the interests of 
the child subjects and of valid research be managed and will there be interim analyses 
performed to ensure any potential risks are identified. Assessments of any risks of 
potential harm should include a review estimate by the researcher as some potential 
harm may not be obvious without careful consideration of their consequences. For 
instance, in non-therapeutic research related to investigations into inherited genetic 
disorders that may present in adult life, while it is asymptomatic in a child or infant and 
it may be beneficial, there is a risk that it may also have very harmful effects from a 
psychological aspect knowing that one has an inherited genetic condition that may 
deteriorate in future years, and may affect the child’s opportunities and their freedom of 
choice. The RCPCH states that risk may be categorised as minimal, low or high whilst 
taking into account social and emotional effects. These are defined as: (a) minimal or 
the least possible risk where any research procedures defined as questioning, 
observations, recording and measuring children, provided that such procedures are 
carried out in a sensitive way, and that consent has been given. Examples of procedures 
with minimal risk include collecting a single urine sample or obtaining blood from a 
sample that has been taken as part of treatment; (b) low risk describes any research 
procedures that may cause brief pain or tenderness, and may cause small bruises or 
scars. Many children fear needles and for them low rather than minimal risks are often 
incurred by injections and venepuncture; and (c) high risk describes any research 
procedures such as organ biopsies (for example, lung or liver biopsy, arterial puncture, 
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and cardiac catheterisation) that are not justified for research purposes alone. These 
procedures should be carried out only when research is combined with diagnosis or 
treatment intended to benefit the child concerned.161 
 
 It is therefore viewed by the research communities that any research that subjects 
children or infants to anything more than minimal risk - defined by the RCPCH above - 
should be subject to serious ethical review. For example, according to the RCPCH,162 
procedures such as blood samplings are very common and whilst an infant cannot give 
consent by reason of immaturity of non-competence, their parents and guardian may 
consent to such research procedures for non-therapeutic research as long as it carries a 
minimal risk and as long as the parent or guardian has sufficient informed consent and 
had been given a full explanation and understands the full extent of the research 
protocols. Many older children fear the venepuncture procedure but a careful 
explanation and understanding of the effectiveness of using local anaesthetic ointments 
may well allow the blood sampling to be performed with little distress. The same could 
be applied for infants who will have no understanding prior to the procedures being 
performed. Such provisions to minimise even the smallest of risk within the research 
design is important. 
  
4.4 Parental Judgement 
 
While parents are judged constantly by fellow parents and the wider community 
in their decision-making towards their child’s welfare, as a society we allow parents the 
right and responsibility to make such decisions concerning the welfare of their infant or 
child without intervening. Decisions that parents make often take into account the best 
interests of the family as a unit, rather than of each individual child. For instance, 
moving to another city and moving schools because of better job prospects are 
advantageous for the family as a unit but may not be the best interest of one child at any 
given time given a child may be uprooted from his or her school and friends. These 
intra-familial trade-offs occur on a daily basis within the family unit with trivial 
situations such as decisions on where the family should go for dinner with every 
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member of the family having their favourite place to eat. Translating this concept into 
decision-making for infants in research, we must continue to allow parents the right and 
responsibility to make practical and informed decisions regarding allowing their infants 
to participate in research, whether it is therapeutic or non-therapeutic research. Parents 
should be given the responsibility to ensure that their infant’s best interests are not 
undermined and be allowed to make an informed decision which also takes society’s 
interests into account with regards to the need for research and its benefit for the greater 
good.  
 
Achieving an acceptable balance between the social good in research, ensuring 
that parents are fully informed of minimal risk and the obligation to protect infants who 
participate in research remains a challenge that should lie with giving parents the rights 
and responsibilities to make such decision. Singer remarks that adults can be motivated 
by an altruistic desire to do good for society, and as such will choose to participate in 
research even if the research has no direct personal benefit and may even impose some 
risk or discomfort.163 The philosopher David Wendler remarked on the life of Irmgard 
Hunt, born in Germany in 1934, who encountered Hitler and his entourage in a park 
when she was 3 years old and was subsequently photographed sitting on Hitler’s lap. In 
a memoir published by Hunt many years later, she expressed concern that the photo of 
her and Hitler was used for Nazi propaganda. Wendler interprets Hunts’ comments that 
she would have felt guilty that she may have passively contributed to the Nazi cause.164 
This interesting analogy shows us that one’s life can be affected in a negative manner if 
somehow one had contributed to an event that was bad even if it was at an age where 
one was too young to take any responsibility for those early actions. If we transposed 
this concept to research participation, then we can infer that the infants who grow up to 
be adults would be equally justified in thinking that it is good for them that they were 
able at a young age to contribute to the development of a better treatment for a 
childhood disease from their participation in research, even if they were too young to 
make the decision at the time. 
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If adults can see that their participation in a research project as something that 
makes their life more meaningful, and hence is within their interests,165 can they also 
ethically make the same choice for their child? This is possible and we can justify 
making these decision as parents who are responsible for their infants’ welfare to allow 
infants who lack capacity to participate in research studies without abandoning the 
principle that it is wrong to use infants in research that will not benefit them. To decide 
when research with infants is justifiable, we must therefore take a stance somewhere on 
the middle spectrum between protection of the infant’s rights and achieving the best 
consequences for the greater good, and ultimately parental choice and information given 
to parents is an important factor. 
 
 
                                                 
165 Truong TH, Weeks JC, Cook EF, and Joffe S. (2011) ‘Altruism among participants in cancer clinical 
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CHAPTER 5: INFORMED CONSENT 
 
 
This chapter discusses how consent in children is taken and interpreted in the context of 
research. It will critically explore the different nuanced approaches to how the process 
of consent has been developed to accommodate different types of situations such as 
deferred consent and presumed consent. 
 
5.1 What is Consent? 
 
 “Consent" describes the positive agreement of a person, whilst “assent” refers to 
acquiescence.166 Both words may mean agreement but assent may just mean a 
preference. The common law of consent is determined by the courts. The legal 
recognition for the principle for consent is that “every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his own body” predates 
modern constitutional jurisprudence.167 In 1765 Blackstone described a common law 
right to bodily integrity as including a right to “the preservation of a man’s health from 
such practices as may prejudice or annoy it”.168 Courts have always upheld a person’s 
right to decide how his or her own body should be protected and the courts have 
consistently rejected any claims that the medical profession or the state have a right to 
force, impose, dictate or withhold an individual’s medical treatment. In Re T (Adult: 
Refusal of medical treatment),169 a young woman who was 34 weeks pregnant and a 
Jehovah’s Witness, refused a blood transfusion after a road traffic accident but the Court 
of Appeal allowed the blood transfusion to proceed in the emergency situation. Lord 
Staughton in the judgement stated that “an adult whose mental capacity is unimpaired 
has the right to decide for herself whether she will or will not receive medical or 
surgical treatment, even in circumstances where she is likely or even certain to die in the 
absence of treatment”. Lord Donaldson also said that “this situation gives rise to a 
conflict between two interests, that of the patient and that of the society in which he 
lives. The patient’s interests consist of his right to self-determination - his right to live 
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his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death”.170 The case illustrates how important it was to have individual consent to a 
medical intervention in any circumstances. 
 
5.2 Consent for Children and Infants 
 
In the UK, consent with respect to children is taken to mean consent from 
parents or the guardian.171 Discussion surrounding children’s competence and ability to 
consent to any medical treatment has focused on the age of the child and the capacity for 
the child to understand what is being proposed in terms of his/her participation, and it is 
the child and not their parents/guardian whose consent is required by law (this was 
termed as “Gillick-competence” which arose from the seminal House of Lords decision 
in 1986).172 If there is dissent from a child or a reasoned refusal to participate in 
research, this is often regarded as evidence of such understanding by the child, and 
parental consent in these circumstances would be disregarded.173 The researcher in those 
circumstances must respect the will of the child if they decline to participate in the 
research study. The law does not at this current time have any form of a benchmark for a 
minimum chronological age but it perceives that a degree of maturity and understanding 
from the child should be taken into account. However, it is important to note that in the 
case of infants, there is insufficient maturity or competence to consent in any 
participation of treatment or research, and therefore ‘parental consent’ must be obtained. 
  
 In principle 11 of the Declaration of Helsinki,174 in the case of minors it does 
stipulate that “permission of a responsible relative replaces that of the subject in 
accordance with national legislation”. In SI 2004/1031 of the EU Clinical Trial 
regulations in 2004, it states that “a person with parental responsibility can give 
informed consent on behalf of a minor, with mothers always having the parental 
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responsibility”.175 Unwed fathers do not automatically have parental responsibility for 
consenting on behalf of their child but they can acquire parental responsibility by being 
named on the child’s birth certificate, applying for and getting a residence order or a 
parental responsibility order, making a parental responsibility agreement with the 
biological mother in a set procedure or being appointed as guardian of the child once the 
appointment takes place, or marrying the mother.176 A step-parent may also gain 
parental responsibility by obtaining a residence order or adopting the child.177 Therefore, 
in the context of research involving infants, whoever holds parental responsibility is 
therefore responsible for the infant's best interests and ultimately signs the consent for 
the research to proceed, taking into account the information given on risks and benefit.  
  
Examples of research experimentation with children date back centuries. 
However, parental consent for children were often taken for granted. Lederer and 
Grodin observed that medical physicians often used their own children to conduct 
immunisation “experiments” or as research subjects on infectious diseases because the 
children were convenient and easily accessible.178 One widely cited example from the 
1790s is Edward Jenner’s experimental injection of his gardener’s son and his own son 
with the cowpox virus to vaccinate them against smallpox.179 
 
 The physical integrity of children is protected by the law today and the 
regulatory framework discussed so far stipulates that it may be against the interests of a 
child to compromise in any way ‘more than minimal’ the child’s physical or 
psychological comfort. Any forms of research conducted in children or infants must 
have the consent of the parent, guardian or child.180 There is a general exception that is 
                                                 
175 UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations at Www.Uk-
Legislation.Hmso.Gov.Uk/Si/SI.2004/1031, accessed 3rd January 2013. 
176 Section 2(2) of the Children Act 1989 provides that where the mother and father are unmarried at the 
time of birth, only the mother will have automatic parental responsibility for the child.  The unmarried 
father does not have parental responsibility unless he acquires it by: i) Registering the birth of the child 
together with the mother - s 4 (1)(a) ii) Formal agreement with the mother – s 4(1)(b), iii) Court order, 
following an application by the father – s 4(1)(c) or iv) Residence order – s 12(1) see Appendix C for 
further information on the ‘Status of Unmarried Fathers’. 
177 Children’s Act 1989, Section 8 states “A Residence Order” means an order settling the arrangements to 
be made as to the person with whom a child is to live. 
178 Lederer M and Grodin M (Eds.). Children as Research Subjects: Science, Ethics and Law (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-5. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Eekelaar J. (1994) ‘The interests of the child and the child’s wishes: the role of dynamic self-
determinism’, International Journal of Law and the Family, 42: 46. 
65 
 
debatable to obtaining prior parental consent in situations whereby there is immediate 
provision of medical care in an emergency situation where research of a treatment is 
being carried out. In this situation, it may be impracticable to even attempt to obtain 
prior informed consent for the proposed research procedures from parents or guardians 
during that time. 
 
5.3 Deferred Consent 
  
In an emergency situation when parental consent cannot be obtained prior to the 
treatment, and when we do not know which is the better treatment option in critical 
situations, then seeking consent in emergency care is unethical if it delays trial treatment 
and obscures or reduces treatment effects.181 There have been two studies described 
which were undertaken in paediatric emergency departments whereby the principle of 
necessity was used. Both these studies were randomised controlled trials of 
anticonvulsants in acute convulsive seizures and the process of consent used was 
‘deferred consent’.182 The studies both received full ethical approval and support, were 
accepted by over 98% of the participating families and their results have led to a change 
in practice throughout the UK.183 In another study, deferred consent was reported to be 
acceptable to most parents and carers of children who had received emergency care and 
had their consent ‘deferred’ in randomised trials of emergency treatments.184 
Interestingly, there have been many trials that have successfully used this approach of 
deferred consent based solely on the urgent need to treat.185  
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However, to require such an attempt to obtain parental consent may also inhibit 
much potentially valuable research. In this situation, it is prudent to obtain prior ethical 
approval from relevant research ethics committees so that it may be ethical to conduct 
any form of research on children in situations of extreme urgency without obtaining 
prior consent. It may still be unlawful if the research were not expected to benefit the 
child and in all cases parents or guardians and, where appropriate, the child must be 
informed about the research as soon as possible afterwards: a requirement in ethics as in 
courtesy. The current European Clinical Trials Directive186 had set specific regulations 
on valid informed consent as the cornerstone of conducting any experimental research 
involving human beings. However, Gamble argued that the EU regulations and 
Directive had made no provisions for consent during emergency situations, therefore 
creating a formidable barrier to research in this setting. As a result, Member States have 
been forced either to operate at variance with the Directive or to accept restrictions in 
emergency care research, and the EU Directive has been acknowledged to have hindered 
the conduct of clinical trials across Europe.187  
 
The GCP regulations stipulate that for children below the age of assent - such as 
neonates, infants, toddlers, and young children - parents are the sole decision-makers as 
to whether the child will participate in research.188 In clinical research pertaining to 
therapeutic or non-therapeutic trials, a parent or legal representative of the child may 
give consent to the full participation of the trial whereby full information has been given 
including aims of the trial, objectives, risks, inconveniences, conditions and the right to 
withdraw from the trial at any point in time.189 There must also be no financial gains 
from participating in any research other than compensation for loss of time from work, 
transport or any subsequent injury. In addition, any pain, fear, discomfort or any 
predicted risk must be disclosed and minimised by the conduct and design of the 
research study with the age of the research participant and relevant disease in mind such 
that the trial must relate to a condition that the child may have, and such risks be 
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specifically defined and monitored throughout the trial.190 In the case of infants, the 
entire power of consent lies with the parent or guardian. The omnipotence of parents 
leaves a child completely vulnerable. Lansdown191 stated that infants were inherently 
vulnerable because of their physical weakness, their lack of knowledge, capacity or 
competence, and their lack of experience which renders them completely dependent on 
the adults around them. Children’s vulnerability means that there is a fundamental 
difference in the way researchers work with a vulnerable child compared to an adult 
subject in terms of obligations and responsibilities. Researchers also need to recognise 
that their moral duty and obligations are as adults to protect the child from harm or risk 
even when this may mean losing access to the child with respect to research recruitment. 
 
 Prompt decision-making may be critical in emergencies and in cases such as 
neonatal resuscitations, use of surfactant treatment in preterm deliveries, different 
modes of ventilatory support and treatment of seizures, there is very little time for 
parents to consider participation into a clinical trial as fast decision-making is required. 
Studies have shown that any reasonable understanding is severely compromised in 
situations that are stressful and that parents are substantially influenced in their decision 
to consent and participate in trials under these circumstances.192 Furthermore, such 
stressful and parental anxieties are often associated with making decisions on behalf of 
one’s child, especially one’s sick child, which can in turn put particular stress and affect 
an adult’s reasoning, comprehension, and decision-making capacities.193 Zupancic and 
colleagues194 found that a small minority of parents would have preferred that their 
doctor advised them on whether to allow their infant child to participate in a research 
study rather than having to decide for themselves. This can be considered unlawful if the 
research was not expected to directly benefit the child and would undoubtedly override 
the autonomy of the parents. However, where there are exceptional cases of medical 
emergencies, under the doctrine of necessity, medical treatment is permitted without 
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consent from the parent or a competent child.195 It is important to note that with deferred 
consent - although practically constructed and accepted by research communities - there 
is no legal construction to its process and the European Clinical Trials Directive had 
made no provision nor reference to allow consent to be presumed even in emergency 
situations. 
 
5.4 Presumed Consent 
 
 Another area that is debatable is ‘presumed consent’ and where antenatal consent 
is sought from the parents. However, such an approach has been criticised because 
parents may pay little attention to the research information given before their child is 
even born in a belief that their infant will be unlikely to be affected by the particular 
condition. This form of consent has been described for example in neonatal resuscitation 
trials in which a newborn infant develops respiratory distress and the intervention must 
be instituted immediately.196 The process of obtaining consent in the conventional way 
for such situations is not practicable or feasible. Interestingly, the ‘opt out’ consent 
processes had been used and was argued that it protects vulnerable families and 
deprived families who may not have the level or understanding of the rationale of the 
research or the consent process to be able to give consent and participate in the study. 
Rogers and colleagues197 found that the option of the ‘opt out’ consent process better 
facilitated research studies and allowed parents to participate in trials which produced 
more generalisable conclusions to research questions and reduced study selection bias. 
In addition, up to 83% of parents who consented would not have retracted their prior 
consent when asked again and only 8% of parents were unhappy with giving their 
consent at the time. The legality of such an approach must be questioned as the pre-
requisite of any research study must be that the best interests of the child must be taken 
into account during the full consent process.198 Moreover, in light of current ethical and 
legal legislations within GCP and EU Clinical Trials Directives, there is no place for the 
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terms ‘opt out’ or ‘presumed consent’ processes today and it must be deemed unlawful 
and unethical as it implies that a parent of an infant would always consent to the 
research without questioning the integrity of the research or the potential harm or risk 
the participation may cause. 
 
5.5 Process of Consent 
 
 The principle of respect for the person underpins the emphasis on the 
confidentiality of personal information and the provision of consent for both medical 
treatment and research participation in therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.199 
Voluntary participation in research allows the research participant to have the freedom 
to withdraw at any time from a research study.200 The informed consent process is 
essential in any form of research undertaken and researchers must have an adequate 
understanding of the process of how the research is being conducted, how the consent 
procedure is explained and to ensure adequate understanding of the research by the 
participant. In the UK, researchers who undertake the informed consent procedure must 
complete also the Good Clinical Practice course.201 Article 3 of 2005/28/EC stipulates 
that the informed consent process must be undertaken in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki:  
 
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately be 
informed of the aims, objectives, methods, anticipated benefits and potential 
hazards of the study and the discomfort it may entail. He or she should be 
informed that he or she is at liberty to abstain from participation in the study and 
that he or she is free to withdraw his or her consent to the participation of the 
research at any point in time.202 
 
This translates to the fact that each participant must have adequate information, 
knowledge and understanding of the research study in question, despite it being either 
diagnostic, therapeutic or a preventative intervention. It also means that they must have 
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an understanding of why the research is being done, what is the potential harm or risk 
attributed, what are the potential benefits of being in the research and what other 
interventions are currently available. The purpose of this consenting process is also to 
allow the participant the absolute right to leave the research at any time without having 
to give a reason and without giving up their legal rights. The process of informed 
consent allows and ensures that the individual has control over what they are embarking 
on by being in the research study and it ensures that they are participating in the 
research when it is consistent with their values, judgments and interests.  
 
 The RCPCH published research guidance which stated that legally valid consent 
process is both freely given and informed. For consent to be freely given researchers 
must offer families no financial inducement, although expenses should be paid such as 
for travel or loss of work, exert no pressure on participants or their families, allow as 
much time as possible to consider whether they wish to participate in the research, be 
allowed to withdraw or refuse to participate at any time even if a consent form has been 
signed without having to give a reason for the withdrawal and be assured that non-
participation in the research will not prejudice the patient’s current treatment.203 
 
 When explaining relevant terms, researchers need to discuss with families the 
consent implications of the study. For example, consenting to a double blind randomised 
trial means not minding which choice of treatment - for instance, intervention versus 
placebo or novel versus conventional options that the child will receive - and that 
neither the family nor their doctor will know which treatment has been given until the 
trial has been completed. These guidelines were designed to benefit children who take 
part in research, children who may be helped by the research findings, and medical 
research itself. Researchers who observe high standards will continue to have public 
support and cooperation. The guiding principles for research were implemented to guide 
and aid those who make decisions for infants who are incapable of making those 
decisions themselves. It is important therefore that those who make those decisions have 
the infants’ best interests at heart.  
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 Parental consent will probably not be valid if it is given against the infant’s 
welfare and interests.204 This means that parents can consent to research procedures that 
are intended directly to benefit the child, but that research that does not have any direct 
benefit to the research subjects (such as non-therapeutic research) can only be validly 
consented to if the risks are minimal or negligible and that the research can be 
reasonably said not to go against the child’s interests.205 The RCPCH takes the view that 
provided the research cannot be carried out in adults, and appropriate risk/benefit 
assessment is carried out, non-therapeutic research is ethical.206 Account must be taken 
of whether non-therapeutic research is necessary and needed in infants because they do 
not respond to drugs the way adults or older children do. Although there is an ethical 
argument to support non-therapeutic research from medical bodies such as the RCPCH, 
it is only lawful if accepted by the courts. In the absence of any clear legal guidance in 
this area, any authorisation of non-therapeutic research involving infants who are 
incompetent would not be deemed to be in the infant’s best interest when he/she does 
not stand to gain from the research participation. Parental consent in this area cannot be 
deemed as sufficient to render this lawful nor would it be ethically justifiable. The law 
remains unclear on any proposed non-therapeutic research involving infants, particularly 
where there is concern that the risk involved is more than minimal. The difficulties in 
how we determine best interests compared with utilitarian views will be fully considered 
in Chapter 6. 
 
5.6 Flaws in Parental Consent 
 
 Some would argue that in the case of infants, the informed consent process itself 
is flawed and can give rise to feelings of powerlessness amongst parents. The consent 
process for infants may be deemed as unethical if parents are emotionally unready, are 
not fully informed or may not have the right level of understanding with regard to the 
research information given. Mason and Allmark reported207 that the informed consent 
process itself may give rise to misunderstanding on the part of parents of infants 
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recruited to a neonatal trial and this was more evident amongst those who were poorly 
educated and emotionally stressed. In another case, relating to a continuous negative 
extrathoracic pressure (CNEP) trial, doctors were said to have “sold” the idea of 
research participation to parents by stating if the study was a kinder, gentler treatment 
and that they had been reported to have avoided the consent issue because they wanted 
to protect the infants, without at any point informing parents that it was a clinical trial.208 
In previous reported studies, from 3.5% to 12% of parents did not even remember that 
they had given consent and parents felt that the discussion surrounding the consent 
process was inadequate and did not provide enough information with regard to 
alternative options from the novel research or the scope of the research protocols and 
methodologies.209 Another study also found that 25% of parents who were approached 
to participate in research for their child, felt obligated to participate due to a feeling of 
being dependent on the investigator or the hospital.210 A recent study suggested that 
many of the parents, at the time of recruitment to research studies, were concerned about 
their child’s condition and treatment and viewed the research as an opportunity to obtain 
otherwise unavailable medications.211 Parents were also inclined to view participation in 
research as a means of guaranteed benefits.212 Parents may also feel guilty when dealing 
with a sick infant or feel coerced into the process of being asked to participate in 
research at a vulnerable or critical time when their child is unwell.213 These findings 
point to a high state of parental stress and anxiety, and the frequent sense of not having 
any real choice. In neonatal research, the mother may be too exhausted or tired to 
mentally absorb all the information given. In some cases, cognitive function may also be 
impaired if the mother is sedated or had analgesia.214 It can be argued that all these 
forms of research trials have flawed consent processes which may be deemed as 
unlawful based on current GCP regulations. 
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5.7 Deficiencies in Consent Forms 
 
 A systematic analysis review of 124 consent forms provided for HIV and AIDS 
research in the US and abroad about study protocol, procedures, risks and benefits found 
that consent forms were too long, spanning 20 pages on average and exceeding 
recommendations for how much information readily can be processed. 215 The language 
and wordings on the consent forms used were also deemed too complex and enough to 
hinder participants’ full understanding of the research.216 Nancy Kass, the author of the 
study, concluded that by making the informed consent forms long and complex, the 
researcher neglected their ethical duty to ensure the research was described in a way that 
the participant could truly understand. Commonly misunderstood concepts in research 
(such as randomisation or placebo) were not explained and given little attention whilst 
confidentiality sections had a median length of two pages compared to fifty-three words 
in explanations of the randomisation procedures.217 In 2013, the Office for Human 
Research Protections in the US issued a statement218 claiming that the Federal 
Government had taken a fundamental step toward addressing a highly unethical trial 
involving premature babies. The trial - the SUPPORT study219 - was funded by the 
National Institutes of Health and the trial involved 23 academic sites in the country 
which took part in conducting a clinical therapeutic trial in premature babies born 
between 24 and 27 weeks gestation who were already at risk of death or eye disease. 
The study tested two methods for regulating oxygen treatment in premature babies 
which were experimental: one group were maintained at a low blood oxygen level and 
the other at a high level of oxygen saturation. The trial led to 1,316 premature infants 
being exposed to an increased risk of blindness as a result of higher oxygen saturation 
levels without informing the parents of the risks to their infants. Further analysis of the 
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trial protocol and consent forms from the 23 institutions demonstrated that deficiencies 
in the consent forms given to parents had failed to disclose the true purpose of the 
research, the risks and the nature of important experimental interventions.  
 
 The general aim of any prospective research is to enable the research participants 
to have a basic understanding of the nature of the research, the processes, purposes and 
risks involved within it. Research trials which involve random assignment to treatment 
and control groups must be clearly explained, and any consent forms and permission 
forms must be written in a way that is easily understood with any potential for risks or 
harms described. Researchers often compensate for any shortcomings in consent forms 
during the consent process by discussing with parents and exploring parents’ 
understanding of the research study in relation to their infant. However, little is known 
about such conversations during recruitment and any failure to fully explain the research 
study constitutes an important deficit within the informed consent process.220 
 
5.8 Deferred Consent in Emergency Situations 
 
 The 2001 European Clinical Trials Directive221, incorporating the ICH 
Harmonised Tripartite Guideline for Good Clinical Practice (ICH GCP)222 regulations, 
produced fixed guidance on what constitutes ‘informed consent’ in clinical research. 
The Directive, however, made no reference or provisions for consent in emergency 
situations. European Member States were forced either to operate at variance with the 
Directive or to accept significant restriction of these types of research.223 Internationally, 
guidelines on emergency consent vary or are not specifically addressed. Legislation to 
incorporate a deferred consent process in emergency situations for incapacitated adults 
and for children were incorporated in 2006 and 2008 in the UK if: (1) urgent treatment 
was necessary; (2) urgent action was needed for the purposes of the trial; (3) it was not 
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reasonably practicable to obtain consent prospectively; and (4) approval to the 
procedure was obtained by an ethics committee.224 This process of deferred consent 
allows research patients to be included in research trials without obtaining their prior 
informed consent or that of their parent or carer (in the case of a legal minor), but 
requires that informed consent is obtained as soon as possible for continued study 
participation.225 However, strict guidance includes wordings which are ambiguous, and 
studies have shown that it has consequently deterred trauma investigators from pursuing 
valuable research endeavours. In particular, the language requiring “community 
consultation” and evidence-based demonstration that existing treatments are “unproven 
or unsatisfactory” must be identified as the most problematic terms to satisfactorily 
address by those aiming to conduct trauma research. Surprisingly, although current 
regulations as described were enacted to guide consent requirements in emergency 
research in order to protect such vulnerable populations (such as infants) from 
exploitation, these same regulations may also serve as barriers to clinical trials in trauma 
research, resulting in depriving this population of infants of benefits of advances from 
research in trauma.226 
 
 In the case of the TIPIT research study on preterm infants,227 some parents had 
expressed concern and distress as to whether their preterm infant were to be randomised 
to a conventional treatment, taking the assumption that the treatment arm was the better 
alternative for their infant who was gravely ill at the time. Their worry was further 
compounded by the uncertainty of whether the research was to be beneficial or may 
cause harm in the first place despite efforts to explain the aims and scope of the 
research. The sense of obligation and anxiety parents experienced during this consent 
process would certainly indicate that the entire consent procedure was inadequate and 
‘non informed’. It has been shown in a study that parents may not understand that the 
treatment has been selected at random and that some parents thought that in a 
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randomised trial, their doctor would ensure that their child would receive the best 
treatment offered and some believed that randomisation meant rationing access to 
difficult clinical decisions.228 Parents who are approached to consent for their child’s 
participation in clinical trials when their child is ill are often making decisions under 
extreme stress. Snowdon also found that many parents choose to trust the physician’s 
assessment rather than make their own decision especially if the recruiter is in the 
medical team.229 In contrast, 88% of parents in a double-blind randomised controlled 
trial were fully aware that their child may be given a placebo treatment instead of 
ibuprofen, an active antipyretic in a study of the prevention of recurrent febrile 
seizures.230 Such diverse observations show that differences may be attributed to the 
educational background and state of mind of parents, the nature of the research study or 
the complexity of the research protocols. 
 
5.9 Inequality between Researcher and Parent  
 
 There is also a difference in power between parent and the ‘doctor-researcher’ 
whereby the parent may fear that their infant would be treated differently if he/she does 
not consent to the request by the doctor for participation in the research within the unit. 
It is evident that the relationship between the researcher and the parent is unequal in 
power and the researcher is seen as someone imbued with knowledge. Factors that may 
exacerbate the situation during the consent process may be an ill child as a potential 
research participant or being in unfamiliar surroundings. Is there a conflict of interest 
from researchers with the current need for achieving adequate recruiting targets? Can 
the researcher remain impartial at the point of information giving and consent? We must 
recognise the vulnerability of the research subject who is the infant as well as the parent. 
The relationship between the researcher and the participants are unequal and factors 
such as an ill infant, unfamiliar surroundings, and highly stressful circumstances further 
exacerbates the already unequal power relationship within the research environment. 
Overall, studies point to the need for particular care in the design and review of 
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processes for seeking parental permission for research that will involve seriously ill 
children and high-stress situations. 
 
 There is also a potential conflict of interest from the parent/guardian if certain 
research studies should provide significant reimbursement for the study participation of 
their child as a token gesture. One would question if this was unethical as the pre-
requisite of any ethical research study participation would be that no one should have 
any direct benefit from the participation. If there is risk of harm or potential side effects 
to the intervention, then parents who consent are not acting in the best interests of the 
child but may gain direct personal benefit if any form of remuneration was provided for 
their child’s participation. Remuneration for personal gain or as enticement to 
participate in research trials is not allowed,231 yet many research trials will remunerate 
parents by payments or vouchers given to reimburse travel expenses, to compensate for 
time off from work, inconvenience and possible discomfort and to show a token 
appreciation for participants’ help, or to pay for people’s help.232 The issue of 
compensation or paying research participants raises ethical questions as there is no clear 
guidance or consensus on this topic but any form of compensation must never override 
the principles of freely given and fully informed consent. Consent by proxy for infants 
will be a significant concern if such incentives are used and one would question who 
benefits more from the participation. Children are therefore susceptible to greater abuse 
because their interests are not adequately protected. We want infants to be able to 
benefit from the advances and accelerating rate of progress in medical care that is 
fuelled by scientific research. However, we do not want to place any infant at any risk of 
harm from participating in any research even if their very involvement may be essential 
to improving the overall medical care of future populations. Although arguments for the 
future health of infants and children are dependent on the performance and access of 
clinical research in which infants participate, it is important that infants are protected in 
research. The current research literature relates to regulations in infants is limited and 
not entirely consistent although it supports a gradual expansion of the involvement of 
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children and infants in discussions and decisions about their participation in research. 
All of those responsible for research involving infants and children need to understand 
the special ethical issues and regulations that are relevant to the conduct of such 
research and the additional protection that must be provided. In certain cases, ethical 
standards must prevail and may preclude some otherwise desirable research. 
 
Although some would argue and object to the idea of parents consenting to their 
infant’s participation in any research that causes them distress, pain, risk of long-term 
harm, why should parents who are fully informed not be able to consent when the 
research carries no more than a minimal risk of significant harm? Parents have such 
rights and responsibilities to be able to consent to the involvement of their child in a 
well-designed research study that would benefit future populations of similar age even 
though the process involves drawing blood, and that doing so would involve only 
momentary pain and a minimal risk of infection which can be considered negligible.  
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CHAPTER 6: BEST INTERESTS VERSUS UTILITARIAN JUDGEMENT 
 
  
6.1 Utilitarianism and Research 
 
 Utilitarianism is defined as the idea that we as individuals will choose the 
morally correct course of action, the one that produces the greatest total benefit for all 
people affected.233 Research has shown that people’s individual differences relating to 
emotion and personality influence their utilitarian judgments and diverse emotions were 
elicited during judgment such as guilt, sadness, disgust, empathy, anger and anxiety.234 
In the trolley dilemma analogy by Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen,235 
a runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed unless steps are taken to 
stop it. The only way to save the five people was to hit a switch that will turn the trolley 
onto another alternate track where it will kill one person instead of five people. Should 
you hit the switch and turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one 
person? In this scenario, most people in the survey said yes they would hit the switch. In 
contrast to another scenario, Greene and colleagues describe the footbridge dilemma 
whereby you are standing next to a stranger on a footbridge that spans over the track, in 
between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this situation, the only way to save 
the five people was to physically push the stranger off the footbridge onto the tracks 
below. If you push the stranger, he will inevitably die but his body will stop the trolley 
from reaching and killing the other 5 people. Should you save the five others by pushing 
this stranger to his death? Most people said no in this survey.236 The differences, 
according to Green and colleagues, from the two scenarios and differing answers 
obtained between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma were due to one 
example being an impersonal moral dilemma and another a personal moral dilemma.237 
It is the same dilemma with a difference between actively killing someone or subjecting 
someone to be killed. The different emotions described do not make it the right moral 
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choice. Green further argued that using personal ethical and moral scenarios allowed 
emotional engagements to influence only personal moral situations. The ethical 
parameter within which ethical decisions or choices take place is ambiguous. We 
assume that the role of medical ethics or the law will guide us to the right choice but, 
arguably, the ‘right choice’ may not be everyone’s ‘right choice’ and the law can often 
‘bend’ towards an option that may be more perverse and the boundaries where our 
acceptance lies are often moved. While the utilitarian approach to morality implies that 
no moral act is intrinsically right or wrong, the deontological ethics is about the nature 
of the action which is either right or wrong and consequences of the action do not 
matter.  
 
 Interestingly, the principle argument justifying medical research in infants is 
utilitarianism. Foster states that “Utilitarianisn has the advantage of simplicity such that 
it only considers the outcome of actions to matter morally and inherent to this approach 
is the disadvantage that it can justify or require harm to some.” 238 Utilitarianism 
therefore fails to offer sufficient moral basis for considering whether the particular 
research conducted in infants is morally acceptable or not as long as it is for the greater 
good.239 Cantor suggested that unless mentally incompetent persons are used in medical 
no therapeutic research, then similar future generations of non-competent persons will 
be deprived of medical advances.240 This can be transposed to similar research in 
vulnerable infants who do not have capacity to make decisions for themselves. The 
importance of research that can only be done in this population is argued to be justified 
by the fact that the social gains outweigh the minor impositions on the mentally 
incompetent subject. However, the applications of a purely utilitarian approach and 
rationale to justify all medical research and interventions aimed at promoting the well-
being of society poses serious moral and ethical concerns. Society cannot treat mentally 
incompetent persons as exploitable for the benefit of others as neither the law nor social 
practice regards profoundly mentally disabled human beings as nonpersons. 241 
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Clinical research has played a crucial role in the development of modern medical 
treatments, and they will continue to be necessary as health professionals seek to 
alleviate existing diseases and improve the survival and morbidity of premature infants. 
The medical benefits of research in infants are substantial to society and that no 
satisfactory replacement is readily available. However, for any research to be ethical, the 
consequences of the research must be considered along with the procedures and the risks 
that the research subjects are exposed to. While utilitarianism cannot help us with these 
concepts, the best interests principle does. 
 
 
6.2 Airedale NHS v Bland and Re A 
 
 In this section, I will discuss how the cases of Airedale NHS v Bland and Re A 
case provide examples of the law and the courts justifying a society preferred choice 
that no one involved in the case really wanted to make, which was to choose life or 
death. Both these cases support the utilitarian concept and illustrate how the court 
judgements supported societal interest and adapted the fundamental principle of best 
interest for the individual. In Bland’s case, the ‘utilitarian’ argument may be 
interepreted by counsel that in terms of resources it would be better for society if 
Bland’s life were to be brought to an end due to substantial cost in health care terms, 
thereby favouring aggregate welfare of others over an individual. Best interest is a 
highly contested concept and the approach is subject to varying degrees of interpretation 
depending on individual circumstances. 
 
 In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,242 the court granted a proposed course of action 
that would eventually terminate life. Tony Bland was a young supporter of Liverpool 
Football Club who suffered severe brain damage in the Hillsborough tragedy which left 
him in a persistent vegetative state. The Airedale NHS hospital applied for a declaration 
that it may be lawful to discontinue all life sustaining treatment and medical support 
measures designed to keep him alive in a vegetative state, including termination of 
artificial delivery of nutrition, assisted ventilation, nutrition and intravenous or oral 
hydration by artificial means. The declaration was granted and Tony Bland subsequently 
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died. This case, together with the previously discussed Simms case, illustrates a judicial 
willingness to adapt best interests interpretations in order to achieve a desired result. 
However, by doing so, the courts appeared to have gone against the principle of ‘first do 
no harm’ in the case of Bland as the decision to discontinue life support would have 
inevitably resulted in the termination of Bland’s life. In the case of Bland, this would 
have been akin to euthanasia which is illegal in the UK.243 There are two kinds of 
euthanasia: (1) active euthanasia, where a deliberate intervention ends a person’s life; 
and (2) passive euthanasia, where a person causes death by withholding or withdrawing 
treatment necessary to maintain life.244  
 
In Re A,245 a case that came before the English Court of Appeal in 2000, Jodie 
and Mary were conjoined twin girls who were born to devout Roman Catholic parents, 
who had travelled from Malta to Britain for medical assistance. Jodie and Mary were 
joined at the pelvis and each twin had her individual heart, lungs, brain and other vital 
organs. The medical evidence was that Jodie, the stronger twin, sustained the life of 
Mary, the weaker twin by circulating oxygenated blood through a common artery, and 
that Mary’s heart and lungs were too deficient to oxygenate and pump blood through her 
own body. With no functioning heart or lungs, Mary’s life depended on her ailing sister. 
If they were not surgically separated, Jodie’s heart would eventually fail and they would 
both die within a few months of their birth. The medical professionals were convinced 
that Jodie would have a functional and worthwhile life but Mary would inevitably die 
within minutes as a result of the surgical separation. The parents refused to consent to 
the operation on religious grounds. It was accepted that the twins were two separate 
persons each having their own individual human rights. The courts under English law 
were obliged to make a decision whether or not the surgery could be performed. It was 
clear that the surgery would kill Mary therefore it would not have been in her best 
interests, but the surgery was in the best interests of Jodie because it gave Jodie a 
definite chance of life that would have been otherwise denied. The courts held that 
“although regard had to be accorded to the parents’ wishes, the proposed operation was 
not a positive act, which would be unlawful because criminal law prohibits any intention 
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of killing”. The medical profession predicted that the surgery would certainly terminate 
Mary’s life and therefore the surgeons, in legal terms, would have intended to kill Mary 
and would have been liable for murder. English criminal law states that where a person 
foresees that death is a virtually certain consequence of their action, then they should be 
regarded by the law as intending to bring about the consequences.246 The court after 
much deliberation agreed that surgery could proceed by justifying a defence of necessity 
in the circumstances. Mary’s death was necessary both to save Jodie’s life and to restore 
Mary to the bodily integrity and autonomy which is her own natural right.247 The courts 
also absolved the medical profession of all criminal liability for Mary’s death on the 
basis that the doctors owed a duty which they would discharge by means of surgery for 
defending Jodie from the threat of fatal harm, a threat in this case that arose from the 
physical burden that Mary had imposed on Jodie through her dependency on Jodie for 
oxygenated blood.248 The courts acknowledged that in this case, it was impossible to act 
simultaneously in the best interests of both twins and agreed that therefore the surgery 
could be lawfully performed on the basis that Jodie’s interests be preferred given that 
Mary was sadly pre-designated for an early death.249 Predictably, the surgery went 
ahead and Mary passed away during the surgery. The parents of Jodie and Mary who 
had refused consent for the surgery applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal 
that there should be no medical treatment including separation surgery to either twin 
without the parents’ consent and that the judge’s decision was wrong on the grounds 
that: 
 
(1) separation of the twins would not be in Mary’s best interests and his decision 
that it would be against the consideration of the evidence, in particular the 
finding that without separation prolonging Mary’s life would be seriously to her 
disadvantage; (2) separation would not be in Jodie’s best interests and his 
decision that it would be was against the weight of the evidence, in particular the 
finding that for Jodie’s separation meant the expectation of a normal life and he 
gave insufficient weight to the medical and other problems that Jodie would face 
if she survived separation; and (3) even if separation would be in the best 
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interests of one or both twins it would be illegal, and the judge’s characterisation 
of the operation as the withdrawal of Mary’s blood supply and permissible as a 
withdrawal of treatment was wrong since the operation required could only be 
characterised as a positive act that would terminate Mary’s life.250 
 
The concept of a utilitarianism approach can be interpreted as going against the 
best interests view of providing only a benefit to the individual. It was surprising in the 
Re A case that the courts had almost ignored the fundamental principle of ‘do no harm’ 
towards the individuals and supported a ‘utilitarian’ judgement to find a compassionate 
solution for Re A. Most of the court decisions have concentrated on the benefits for all 
concerned, given the hope of a satisfactory outcome. Greene noted that “judgements 
from a psychological point of view, utilitarian judgements were defined as endorsing 
harmful actions that promote the greater good”.251 Moll and de Oliveira-Souza wrote 
that utilitarian judgements tended towards favouring the aggregate welfare over the 
welfare of fewer individuals.252 In relation to Re A, the court’s decided that Mary’s 
suffering would continue and eventually she would have died a suffocating death within 
three months together with Jodie. Thus, it would have been in both Mary’s and Jodie’s 
best interests to perform the surgery before the inevitable occurred. 
 
6.3 Applying Principles of Best Interests 
 
 In the context of therapeutic research involving infants where one cannot 
guarantee a better outcome as a result of an intervention - and may in fact have 
significant risk of a worse outcome as a result of the research intervention - the principle 
of best interests is not without controversy. This is even more contentious in non-
therapeutic research where the individual infant receives no personal benefit from the 
research participation. It can be further interpreted that parents acting on behalf of their 
infants be given the choice to adopt a utilitarian approach such that child’s interests is 
for the good of society in the context of research participation. Can we quantify minimal 
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risk and ‘bend the law’ that states it has to be in the best interests of the non-competent 
individual, as in the case of Re A? 
 
 The courts may not be in a position to scrutinise medical evidence and what is 
deemed as best interests from a medical point of view may be only acceptable from a 
child or parent’s perspective when taking into account other factors such as emotional 
and welfare issues.253 The right is specific only from a parent-child relationship and only 
where the child is under the age of majority and the courts are not bound to act in 
accordance with the parents’ wishes. If they were to only act on the parents’ wishes then 
any protective function that the court should uphold over young children, especially 
infants or children who lack capacity, would be impossible. The ability to override a 
parent’s decisions is dependent on the fact that the parent’s role is for the benefit of the 
child rather than to exercise any power over them as an independent right of the parent. 
It is also based on a judgment by the court to determine if the parents’ wishes should be 
overridden when considering a parental decision that is disputed. It is said that the courts 
must exercise its jurisdiction in the interests of children.254 Notwithstanding judicial 
statements such as this, it is the best interests test that has allowed the courts to override 
parental decisions even if they are up to the interpretation of the court and their decision 
regarded as solely being devoted to the interests of the child that may or may not reach 
societal expectations. Substitution of parental decisions may be legitimate if the parents 
are endangering the essential interests of the child. For instance, if the treatment is 
conventional and routine with low risk to the child, the refusal may result in serious 
injury or harm to the child. Therefore, in these circumstance, safeguarding the interests 
of the child with respect to his or her health, justifies overriding any parental decision. It 
may well be justifiable to rule that the decision of the parents do not meet a reasonable 
standard. It is recognised that medical intervention outside of the standard treatment of a 
child poses greater difficulties in assessing best interests for the child such as in 
therapeutic research involving infants where either being on the treatment or placebo 
arm of the therapy may have a benefit or it may cause harm. Where there are no clear 
benefits to the infant, then the best interests test is difficult to apply and in some 
situations controversial and requires some manipulation of the concept. For example, in 
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the case of Re Y,255 a profoundly mentally disabled woman who was found to be the 
only compatible bone marrow donor to her older sister suffering from leukaemia. Y 
lived in a residential home all her life and had no relationship with her sister but was 
attached to their mother. The judge ruled in a convoluted reasoning that it would be in 
Y’s best interest to donate the bone marrow to her sister because if her sister were to die, 
her mother would be extremely distressed. In a case of a donor without mental capacity, 
and as such extrapolated to infants, the hope and ability to improve the life or health of a 
sibling is a powerful motivation for the donor’s best interests as opposed to losing the 
sibling altogether no matter how trivial the sibling relationship is described. Is it of any 
best interests to the donor child if the tissue or organ donation poses moderate risk to his 
or her health? This can only occur if a broader concept of the best interests test is taken 
into account to take precedence over the donor’s health (for example, a test that would 
allow procedures which are not against the person’s best interest should be lawful). 
Whether the medical intervention poses a negligible, minimal, moderate or a significant 
harm to the infant’s interests without any reasonable benefit needs to be assessed.  
 
The Children’s Act 1989256 states clearly that when the courts make any ruling in 
family proceedings they must put the welfare of the child as paramount. In another 
argument, the courts could make a judgement to choose what the child would choose as 
an adult in an altruistic manner. It may pose no direct benefit to being a donor and, in 
effect, may cause harm but it would also save the life of a sibling. To this extent, it may 
be argued that there is no single one best interests choice for the infant, but there are a 
range of possibilities that may be equally well chosen and argued for. 
 
6.4 Can we Justify Utilitarianism? 
 
 The utilitarian justification for maintaining and contributing to research rests 
ultimately on a calculation of the whether the minimal risk subjected to infants 
outweighs the good for society that the research will bring. The utilitarian view is the 
belief that morally right actions are those that produce the greatest good or greatest 
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happiness for the greatest number of people.257 Utilitarianism goes against the best 
interests view of providing only a benefit to the individual. The opposing view is the 
deontological approach in believing that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, 
regardless of any intentions behind the actions or consequences as a result of the actions. 
How we marry up the two views when it comes to research involving infants will 
depend on the processes involved within the research and how much risk the infant is 
exposed to. The argument for research involving infants is justifiable if the risks 
involved are minimal such that it will have no long lasting harm for the infant. As long 
as the choices made do not involve acting to change a system for the worse, a person or 
infant may demote their personal interests to cause a great deal of good for society. 
Morality, ethics and other interests come into play in the decision making 
process. While there are criticisms that utilitarianism has no emphasis on the element of 
best interests, it is arguable that the life of every person or infant includes a process of 
balancing personal desires with greater, societal moral considerations.  
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CHAPTER 7: REVIEW AND REVISION OF RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
 
 Shifting the paradigm from protectionism to access is essential in protecting 
infants, but not at the expense of excluding them from research that may benefit them in 
the short- and/or long-term. Continuous information sharing and communications with 
parents and guardians during the consent process must occur and non-therapeutic and 
therapeutic research should still be pursued in the future. Obtaining consent in any 
research involving infants is pivotal to ensuring that the research is legitimate. But how 
do we adequately regulate parental consent and address the issue of infant’s 
participation in research?  Should it be invalid for non-therapeutic trials? Do parents 
actually understand the basis and context of the research they are consenting to on 
behalf of their infant? Current research regulations remain too paternalistic and in some 
cases contradictory when it comes to research involving infants. This thesis has argued 
that there are certain conditions that affect only infants and treatments used for infants 
have not been properly researched and are based on adult type studies extrapolated 
inaccurately for use in infants and children. Yet, infants are put in a double jeopardy and 
disadvantaged in their position by the reluctance to allow infants to participate in 
research. There should be much broader scope towards recognising the acceptance and 
the approach for allowing research involving infants. The issue of tightening the consent 
procedure as discussed is part of a solution. Feinberg258 argued that there is justification 
of the right to intervene in a child’s life for the sake of the child’s future autonomy and 
their right to an open future. This may include restrictions to legislation which limit the 
parent’s right to consent to participate in research. This kind of approach will be 
problematic as it does not take into account that the adult would share the same interests 
as the child in their open future and would act in their best interests. This argument also 
assumes that there are no relevant differences between children and adults.259 However, 
childhood is a vulnerable and formative time when any risk of harm can have serious 
impact on the well-being of the infant and be potentially long lasting. Potential harms 
should therefore be assessed carefully before children or infants are put at risk. A more 
robust approach to allow infants to participate in research - whether it is therapeutic or 
                                                 
258 Feinberg J. ‘The child’s right to an open future’ in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton 
University Pressm 1992), 76-98. 
259 Dickenson D. and Jones, D. (1996) ‘True wishes: the philosophy and developmental psychology of 
children’s informed consent’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 2: 287-303. 
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non-therapeutic - is still ethically defensible. Clinical therapeutic research must relate to 
the condition from which the infant suffers and that there is no alternative but to use this 
population at the time for research. They must also be in direct benefit to the 
involvement of the research. The term 'direct benefit' may seem a little restrictive but 
there may be some challenges towards the notion of what constitutes ‘direct benefit’. 
For example, a potential ‘indirect benefit’ if exposing the infant to only minimal risk, 
may include the future benefit of the infant knowing that he or she had contributed to 
the research and had made a contribution to the ‘greater good’. We can argue that this 
concept of ‘imposed altrusim’ constitutes an individual benefit to the infant participating 
in research, albeit a reason that is difficult to assess. 
 
 The discretion and considered decision may lie with the courts to approve the 
infant’s participation over the parents’ wishes, considering factors such as whether the 
risks to the infant are commensurate with the benefits derived, whether the drug has 
been tested in other populations (such as adults and older children) and what knowledge 
has been acquired from off-label use. However, these are difficult to assess. Approval 
should also be sought to affirm the decision to allay researchers’ fears of liability and to 
provide greater oversight to any decisions. Perhaps there should be an independent body 
that takes into account the best interests of the infant from which the consequence may 
be a loss of participation in non-therapeutic trials? How do we strike a balance then 
between benefits to the greater good or the best interests and welfare of the infant in 
such trial participation? There should be more understanding about how children may be 
affected by their experiences and, in the case of infants, learning about their effects and 
responses are important. According to the Declaration of Helsinki, the individual subject 
must always prevail over science and society. The European Commission had intended 
to draft legislation forcing drug companies to undertake drug research in children in 
order that their therapeutic needs are appropriately addressed but it was not captured 
within the EU Directive.260 Further proposals were made in the form of incentives, and 
regulatory and supportive measures with respect to clinical research and development 
were proposed to ensure that any new development of medicinal drugs for children were 
                                                 
260 Hawcutt DB and Smyth RL. (2008) 'The new European regulation on paediatric medicines: regulatory 
perspective', Paediatric Drugs, 10(3): 143-6. 
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researched and adapted to their needs.261 It is also important to ensure that new 
medicinal products used in children should have appropriate data, research and safety 
information must be in place to benefit the child. In 2008, the European Medicines 
Agency set up a network of research networks, investigators and centres with recognised 
expertise in performing clinical studies in children called the European Network of 
Paediatric Research. Their objective was to facilitate studies in order to increase 
availability of medicinal products authorised for use in the paediatric populations and 
allowing collaboration with members from within and outside the European Union 
including academia and the pharmaceutical industry. The network however, does not 
perform clinical trials or fund studies or research or decide on areas for paediatric 
research.262 The purpose of research involving infants should be in the infant’s best 
interests, and any guideline advocating research or intervention should not be “contrary 
to” or against the child’s best interests. Best interests may be interpreted in different 
ways, such as in examples of non-therapeutic pharmacokinetic drug research, and 
information on safety is essential in infants and cannot be extrapolated from adult 
research. It can be argued that the child stands to benefit from the research in the future 
if the drug being studied continues to be required for the child’s health. 
 
 The need to offer infants any potential benefits of medical research is important 
and necessary. Existing regulations and legislation are designed to afford protection to 
infants who participate in research. The existence of specific ethical guidance, 
regulations and legislation do not alter the fact that all people, patients, health 
professionals, and researchers alike have a moral duty of care and a duty to do no harm 
upon others. It is a general moral principle which forms the basis of the duty of care 
each person has to prevent any harm coming to others through his or her acts or 
missions and hence a moral duty to participate in research. For example, we have a 
moral duty to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to protect future generations. 
Governments have passed laws to support such utilitarian views. The translation to 
infants, however, appears to be the opposite where historically there has been a 
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reluctance to involve any infants in research participation, even where there were direct 
benefits. The expectation to participate in research involving infants is well-founded. If 
anything can claim a benefit to a greater good, then it is healthcare and the practice of 
medicine. We have seen this from the history of medicine and production of vaccines 
and cures to illnesses. It is in everyone’s interest that healthcare is of the highest 
standards. Yet, the highest standards and treatment in healthcare cannot be achieved 
without medical research and the cooperation of those who can render the research 
valid. It is not unreasonable that the willingness to participate within the boundaries of 
minimal risks is a reasonable expectation of everyone, including of parents, to allow 
their infants to participate in research. If every one of us stands to gain from healthcare 
resulting from research either past, present, or future, then it stands that we all have a 
part in our moral duty to contribute to medical research when the risks involved are 
minimal. Similar to the reasoning that we have a moral duty to enrol in organ donation 
or in blood donation as it is to do good for society, if each person takes a deontological 
view that there is no direct personal benefit to themselves, then society will collapse and 
cease to function. To expect participation in research is to therefore presume that there is 
a willingness for parents, on behalf of their infants, to do what is reasonably right, and to 
do what any reasonable, moral person should do when risks of harm are considered 
minimal. There is indeed a balance to be had between the duty to act in the best interests 
of the infant with a moral expectation and obligation to the future patients who would 
stand to gain from the research. Although this approach is neither reflected in the current 
legislation nor in case law, there is some evidence that the courts may be sympathetic to 
procedures more beneficial to the community where these are not against the interests of 
the child and where the risks are minimal. In S v S, Lord Reid concluded that the courts 
ought to permit the blood test of a young child to be taken unless it was proven that it 
would be against the child’s best interests.263 In Doherty v McGynn264 the Inner House 
of the Court of Session held that in the exercise of its inherent protective jurisdiction in 
relation to children, the court could intervene and refuse to admit any evidence if it was 
not in the child’s interests to do so. Both these cases were determined on a case by case 
                                                 
263 S v S [1972] AC 24, HL 
264 Doherty v McGlynn 1983 SLT 237. After a hearing on a reclaiming motion, the First Division granted 
both James Docherty and William McGlynn authority to have blood samples taken from Charlene 
Docherty, the child to be seriologically tested for grouping 1983 S.C. 202. 
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basis taking into account the issues as the level of information was given in the decision-
making process about risks involved and the interests of the child.  
  
 The approach adopted by the RCPCH as an advisory medical college in the UK 
may be instructive in its guidance on research involving children and infants.265 The 
RCPCH states that research is allowed where it poses no greater than minimal harm or 
risk and where it offers direct benefit to the individual research subject. The difficulty 
lies in the interpretation that the RCPCH would still support research where it poses no 
greater than minimal risk but offers no prospect of direct benefit to the individual but 
may yield information about their condition and where understanding may be advanced 
about a serious health problem. Any such disagreements about the notion of what 
constitutes ‘minimal risk’ should be determined by independent ethics committees to 
scrutinise all research proposal prior to any approval for recruitment. Brazier argued that 
judges and courts should not be the final arbiters of acceptable research practice, but 
suggests that the establishment of any code of practice in the context of research 
underpinned with statutory requirements of where consent can be given and by whom, 
should be overseen by independent expert scrutiny such as research ethics committees 
who will ensure that parents are given fully informed consent and that the consenting 
procedures are not flawed as discussed in Chapter 5. She also suggests, where children 
are concerned, it is mandatory that a paediatrician and other relevant health 
professionals be called upon to be part of the independent ethics panel.266 
                                                 
265 See n153. 
266 Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Law (London, Penguin, 2003).  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Clinical research involving infants is important and required for the reasons 
explained earlier. Understanding and complying with the special ethical and regulatory 
protections for infants constitutes challenges to research and such challenges underscore 
the need for those reviewing research protocols that include the subgroup of children 
who lack capacity to make decisions on their own, to have adequate expertise in 
different areas of child health and research. Clinical trials, whether they are categorised 
as therapeutic or non-therapeutic, must be scientifically sound. The fact remains that 
infants are not adults and some conditions only affect infants and that a significant 
proportion of drugs prescribed today for infants remain untested. Any trial that exposes 
the participant to significant risks or burdens without yielding any meaningful results 
and that do not test the hypotheses are deemed as unethical. Randomised controlled 
trials are often considered the best way to provide the most meaningful results as 
participants are randomly exposed to either a placebo versus the treatment, or 
conventional treatment versus the novel treatment. The participant in this case stands to 
gain from being in either arm of the trials which are conducted to determine which 
provide the best results. However, only a handful of cases have addressed the issue of 
non-therapeutic research in non-consenting and non-competent subjects, and the results 
have similar concerns pertaining to the argument of what risk is deemed as acceptable, 
and whether the research in question offered some benefit to the subjects and therefore 
may be regarded as therapeutic in nature. When efficacy data from any adult research 
trial cannot be extrapolated to the target group of population - such as infants - then non-
therapeutic research is required. 
 
Such debates are open for further factual developments and it would be 
important for communities such as legal and scientific research practitioners to 
collaborate and to closely examine, understand, analyse and address the ethical and legal 
issues that so concerns the courts. The framework does not currently exist to deal 
effectively with ethical issues that arise as infants become research subjects in non-
therapeutic research. This thesis has attempted to reconcile the arguments for and 
against non-therapeutic research involving infants and deliver a review and revision of 
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research methods and guidelines surrounding the use of infants in non-therapeutic 
research. It is clear that scientific advancement through the conduct of research has 
improved the quality of lives. Vaccines produced against diseases, new technology to 
understand functions of the body, new medications to eliminate infections and disease 
progression have all been the result of carefully conducted research and the dedication 
of scientists. Yet the position of infants has been neglected in previous and recent legal 
and ethical regulatory frameworks and guidance, and we need to bolster their position 
such that infants are more widely considered in an optimal manner to allow their 
engagement in both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research where there is minimal 
risk. Research involving infants must continue, but it should be carried out within 
strictly circumscribed limits to ensure that infants are not unduly exposed to greater than 
minimal harm or risk.  
 
A more balanced approach is needed that is necessary and timely to justify a 
research proposal to include an infant in a clinical trial, rather than have blanket 
avoidance because of a fear that it may be unethical due to age. There is a need to find a 
more useful approach towards research involving infants, and to be persuaded that there 
is a common good argument that follows finding such an approach where there is an 
expectation that everyone albeit infants should participate in research within proper 
governance and ethical regulations to safeguard all participants’ interests. Researchers 
should recognise the vulnerability infants when they are recruited to clinical trials and 
should remain impartial whilst ensuring that parents are given fully informed consent to 
decide on their infants’ behalf. Infants and children should be afforded the same equal 
opportunities to benefit from research as adult subjects. The pursuit of knowledge is 
valuable but it is not the ultimate goal. Research and its acquisition must be underpinned 
by core values and unified within ethical and legal regulations. The world must 
safeguard against a country repeating the unethical and heinous crimes from the Nazi 
experimentation on human subjects. Children’s rights are universal and cover the span 
of childhood up to the age of eighteen. Parental rights and sole parental consent can 
deter rather than facilitate the best interests of the child and some professional 
guidelines on consenting for incompetent and vulnerable infants may be deemed as too 
permissive. Interestingly, Friedman Ross argues that the best interests standard is too 
individualistic and does not allow parents to make decisions which can take into account 
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the interests of the family as a group. She states that “to hold parents to a best interests 
standard which cannot accommodate intra-familial trade-offs is to misunderstand the 
role of parents and the value of the intimate family”.267 The best interests standard is not 
such a viable criterion that conflicts may also arise between two parents who may have 
divergent views on what are the best interests for their infant. Parents act, therefore, as 
surrogate decision makers who give or refuse permission for treatment on the basis of 
what they believe to be in the child’s best interests. It is arguable that parents have a 
wide discretion as to what may or may not be in the infant’s best interests and they are 
not bound to meet the best interests as the courts have interpreted it. Furthermore, the 
application of the best interests principle is contentious and problematic when the 
research intervention may be of no benefit to the infant participating in the research 
even though the involvement of infants who represent a unique population may be vital 
in improving the care of future populations of infants. However one interprets the best 
interests test, there are still many unknown factors and conflicting evidence as to what 
will best serve the welfare of the child. The application of the best interest test is not 
straightforward and a wider interpretation of the best interests test may allow the test to 
be stretched and manipulated in order to achieve the desired results. The best interest 
test can be constructed to accommodate social interests as we have seen in the Re A, Re 
Y and Simms cases that has been examined. They are examples where the best interest 
test can be re-calibrated to balance minimal risk versus benefit to others. We may justify 
this approach that may be in conflict with the direct best interests principle, and the 
opinions of the medical profession have been regarded with a greater willingness of the 
courts to allow other factors to override the interpretations involved in decision-making 
about the welfare of children.  
 
The conventional approach to the best interests argument has problems in the 
context of research involving infants and is particularly difficult to apply in certain 
situations such as procedures or intervention that has no therapeutic benefit to the infant. 
It will require some stretching of the concept to justify such an approach which is 
already prevalent in healthcare practice and research communities today. Legal and 
ethical guidance on how we place the infant’s best interests and balancing of risk and 
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harm into the context of research is required and particularly the question whether the 
best interests test is appropriate in deciding the issues discussed. Earlier this thesis 
provided an outline and assessment of the legal and ethical framework for recruiting 
infants into clinical research, which shows a clear gap in the laws and ethical guidelines 
surrounding recruitment of infants into therapeutic and non-therapeutic clinical research 
trials. Research involving infants raises difficult issues in relation to ethics, social policy 
and law but it is essential that research is carried out in infants.  
 
There is a paucity of information or regulation on the extent of the infant’s rights 
to protection from possible harm and the ethical issues surrounding sole parental 
consent on behalf of the infant, as well as exploring conflicts of interests amongst 
researchers when actively recruiting infants into research. The core issues which emerge 
from the application of current research and legal frameworks make the case for a 
clearer articulation of the content and principles of current standards that exist to include 
the role of research involving infants. The thesis has clearly shown where the current 
gaps are: in the law, its policies and the ethical guidelines on research involving infants. 
It has drawn upon case studies and anecdotal experience as a clinical researcher 
involved in the recruitment of infants into therapeutic and non-therapeutic trials. 
 
 Despite the current guidance from ethical and legal perspectives as outlined 
earlier, it is clear that there is a loud silence surrounding research involving infants. We 
need a more rigorous approach that can be adopted to ensure that infants rights are 
protected but they are allowed to continue to participate in research weighing the 
benefits and risks at stake from the research, and ensuring that risks are indeed minimal 
and distress to the infant is trivial with their parents fully informed of the consent 
procedures. This may be achieved by ensuring that there are sufficiently sophisticated 
assessments, consenting procedures and allowing a presumption that every infant may 
wish to participate in research that does not necessarily directly benefit themselves as 
individuals but would benefit their population as a whole. Ethical guidelines should 
facilitate research in children in a wider context where full information has been given 
to parents or legal guardians including objectives, risks, inconveniences, conditions and 
rights to withdraw. Ethical standards for participation in research require that the 
agreement to participate be freely given; that is, it should not be either coerced or 
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unduly influenced by psychological, financial or other pressures. There must be no 
financial inducements, conflicts of interests or any other compensation for participation 
apart from compensation due to injury or loss. The major concern about payments 
related to research participation is that they may unduly influence and distort decisions 
about research participation made by individuals in their own right or by parents on 
behalf of their child. Some types of payments to parents such as reimbursement for 
reasonable expenses like travel are necessary for participation in research. Any other 
form of payments that involve paying parents for permitting their child to be exposed to 
a greater research risk are not ethical nor lawful under the Clinical Trials Regulations.268 
Compensation to parents for lost wages or time may be appropriate under carefully 
scrutinized circumstances. Pain and discomfort, fear and any foreseeable risks must be 
minimised and scrutinised by design of the trial with age of the child in mind, and with 
risk thresholds and degrees of distress defined and monitored closely in the conduct of 
the research. 
 
 This does not advocate that all infants be subject to undue risk nor for those 
close to them to be excluded from being involved in the decision-making within the 
research process, but for parents to be fully informed of research processes and be given 
the responsibility to make decisions on behalf of their infants. There cannot be a 
deontological view when it comes to research involving infants as there are no absolute 
right or wrong approaches with regard to research participation given the difficulties and 
ambiguity in current legal and ethical guidelines on research. Parents are allowed on a 
daily basis to make decisions for their child and they have the responsibility to 
determine what they believe to be in the best interests of their infant, what is appropriate 
and subject to harm limitations. On a daily basis even the courts establish a balancing of 
harms and benefits to children in making decisions concerning their welfare. So to this 
extent, the approach to research involving infants should be weighed in a similar regard. 
We should not be asked to declare a single response as to what is best for the infant 
when there are a range of reasonable responses that could be made. It is possible to 
reconcile legal guidelines with the rights of the child, and to serve the best interests for 
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the child and the greater good of the community. The correct approach is not to give up 
on a best interests approach but to try and minimise its pitfalls.  
 
 Parental consent to research interventions are intended directly to benefit the 
child to some extent, but similarly the extent of the risks should be sufficiently small to 
mean that the research can be reasonably said not to go against the child’s interests.269 
Valuable and important research in certain circumstances can only be done in infants 
because of the particular aims of the research study. However, when choice of age is 
possible, older children should be involved in preference to younger ones, and research 
in children or infants should only be undertaken if the research in adults were not 
feasible. The academic and scientific community must recognise the importance of 
sound ethical research conducted in infants today as well as scientific progress if it is to 
sustain the support and trust of policymakers and the public including parents who 
consider the enrolment of their infants into research. The benefits that medical or 
clinical research has brought to infants, children and adolescents are remarkable with 
recent decades proving that medical research has helped change medical care and public 
health practices in ways that have saved or lengthened the lives of tens of thousands of 
children around the world and prevented illness or disability worldwide. However, 
utilitarian arguments for research involving infants are contrasted with deontological 
views of a focus on the infant’s rights and best interest alone. A narrow reading of the 
best interests approach cannot possibly run in today’s approach to research involving 
infants, but a wider interest of society as well as the individual’s interest but develop in 
line with a changing society. There is a moral duty for parents to allow their infants’ 
participation in research and there is also a duty to do no harm. Where risks are deemed 
as minimal, it is fair to expect a utilitarian view that everyone should contribute to 
healthcare in a way that would benefit all for a greater good. Although the existing 
legislation and ethical guidance are focused to provide protection to individuals 
involved in research, there is a general moral principle to expect each and every person 
to be willing to participate in research that will benefit healthcare especially where the 
risk of harm is minimal or non-existent. This approach is not reflected in the law or the 
current legislations for research although there is some evidence that the courts may be 
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sympathetic to the idea that parents may consent to procedures that may benefit the 
community when they are not against the child’s best interests. Each case is often 
unique and determined by its own merits within a general framework of legal and 
ethical guidance and principles. The lack of good research will have societal 
implications for future healthcare. In conclusion, the proposals and arguments contained 
in this thesis aim to strike a balance between appropriate protection and empowerment 
to ensure that the interests of infants are not undermined, together with the needs of the 
society and research communities by allowing parents to be responsible in allowing 
their infants to participate in research with minimal risk for the benefit of the greater 
good.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
 
Writing this thesis has been a challenge as I realised that I had embarked on a task that 
was interdisciplinary with very different ideological approaches, as well as being 
influenced by both my personal and professional history. 
 
I hope that the key conclusions and recommendations not only raises an awareness of 
the issues described but also represent a balanced opinion for consideration by law 
makers, policy makers, and health professionals to assist parents and their children in 
future research participation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A. Mental Capacity Act 
 
 The Mental Capacity Act applies to England and Wales only. As of 1st of 
October 2007, medical research covered by the Act in section 30 to 32, cannot include 
any people who lack capacity to consent to the research unless: 
 
 The research has the approval of a research ethics committee recognised by 
either the Secretary of State or the Welsh Assembly Government as appropriate. 
 The researcher considers the views of carers and other relevant people. 
 The research treats the person’s interests as more important than those of science 
and society. 
 The researcher respects any advance decisions or expressed preferences of a 
person who lacks capacity and any objections the person makes during the 
research 
 The research must be connected with an impairing condition affecting the patient 
or his/her treatment. There must be reasonable grounds for believing that 
research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out if the project has to 
be confined to, or related only to persons who have capacity to consent to taking 
part in it. 
 
The research must have the potential to benefit without imposing a burden that is 
disproportionate to the potential benefit or intended to provide knowledge of the causes 
or treatment of, or of the care of persons affected by, the same or a similar condition. 
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B. Good Clinical Practice and Related Legislation and Directives 
 
The EU Directive 65/65/EC270 resulted in the formation of a Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP), which first assessed whether candidate 
products complied with Directive 65/65/EEC after the postnatal side effects of 
thalidomide in the treatment of pregnancy emesis became a worldwide concern, and the 
requirement of licensing of all medicinal products was mandated in 1965 for all member 
states. In 1975, EU Directive 75/318/EEC stated that each member state be required to 
ensure that the submission of safety and efficacy for marketing authorisation and Good 
Laboratory Practice (GLP) were formed encompassing the principles of non clinical 
testing of pharmaceutical products and the requirements of GCP in conducting research. 
It stated that "all phases of clinical experimentation shall be designed, implemented and 
reported in accordance to GCP 75/318/EEC”. This enforcement would appear to apply 
to non-therapeutic research and its guidance on conduct. In 1991, the European 
Commission published the ‘Enforcement of the EEC Note for Guidance: Good Clinical 
Practice for Trials on Medicinal Products in the European Community’.271 The Directive 
75/318/EEC was not legally binding until a modification to the Council Directive in 
91/507/EEC.272 The EU Directive in 91/507/EEC required all European member states 
to bring into force the laws and regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with the Directive that requests all clinical trials to be designed, implemented, 
recorded and reported according to GCP policies. In 1996, the International Conference 
of Harmonisation (ICH) issued guidelines for GCP- the ICH 1996 which was developed 
to promote international consensus on mutual regulations on clinical trials and 
marketing authorisation procedures. It was later adopted by the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP, now the CHMP) and formally accepted as a 
standard in European Union states in 1997, thus replacing the previous EU GCP 
guidance. Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament on laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relates to the implementation of GCP in the conduct of all 
research for human use. The community code related to medicinal products for human 
                                                 
270 Commission decision for the granting of marketing authorization for the medicinal product for human 
use OJ No L 214 of 24th August 1993, 1. 
271Good Clinical Practice 2013 accessed 15th April 2013 at 
www.mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medicines/Inspectionandstandards/GoodClinicalPractice/index.htm.  
272 Directives are binding on Member States insofar as they have to implement or amend national 
measures to give effect to the main aims and objectives of the Directive, but such have a degree of 
flexibility as to how to achieve this in the light of their individual domestic context. 
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use (2001/83/EC) was later amended in 2003 by 2003/63/EC stipulating that all clinical 
trial research data used for marketing authorisation applications in the European Union 
are required to be conducted in accordance to the GCP. 
 
Table 1: History of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and Related Legislation and 
Directives273 
Year Event Comment 
1947 Nuremberg Code Principle of informed consent 
 
1964 (revised 
1975, 1983, 
1989,1996) 
 
Declaration of 
Helsinki 
 
 
1965 65/65/EC Licensing of medicinal product 
 
1968 Medicines Act 
 
 
1975 75/318/EEC Safety and efficacy requirement for 
marketing authorisation. GLP became the principle 
of non-clinical testing 
 
1991  
 
91/507/EEC GCP in EEC 
1997 CPMP/ICH/135/95 ICH GCP published by Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products 
 
2001 2001/20 EC EU Clinical Trial Directive 
 
2001 2001/83/EC (part 
4, B1) 
 
Community code on medicinal product, 
requirement of GCP in conducting clinical trials 
 
2003 2003/63/EC Amendment on 2001/83/EC. Part 1, 
5.2.c deﬁnes holding period of essential clinical 
trials document 
 
2003 2003/94/EC GMP requirements for IMP 
 
2003 EUDRACT EUDRACT database guidance note 
 
2003 Annex 13 Manufacture of IMPs 
 
 
                                                 
273 Good Clinical Practice 2013 
http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medicines/Inspectionandstandards/GoodClinicalPractice/index.
htm. Accessed April 15th 2013 
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2004 2004/27/EC (13) GCP requirement for clinical trials 
outside the EEA 
 
2004 SI 2004/1031 The Medicines for Human Use 
(Clinical Trials) Regulation’s 2004 
 
2005 2005/28/EC Guidelines for GCP 
 
2006 SI 2006/1928 The Medicines for Human Use 
(Clinical Trials) Amendment Regulation’s 2006 
 
EEA, European Economic Area; GLP, good laboratory practice; GMP, good 
manufacturing practice; ICH, International Conference on Harmonisation; IMP, 
investigational medicinal 
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C.  The Status of Unmarried Fathers  
 
The Welfare Reform Act 2009 contains provisions that mandate compulsory joint birth 
registration for unmarried fathers. The idea was that if unmarried fathers will be jointly 
named on their child’s birth certificate with the mother, ensuring these fathers had 
parental responsibility for their children would also encourage them to play a role in the 
child’s life and maintain the child.  
 
In Section 56 and Schedule 6 of the Welfare Reform Act 2009, in force since May 2012. 
These sections make significant amendments to the Children Act 1989.274 The 
provisions impose a duty upon an unmarried mother to provide details of her child’s 
father when she registers the birth (unless certain conditions apply).275 The Act included 
provision for enabling the registrar to contact the person identified by the mother.  If he 
confirms that he is the father, his name will be entered on the register, granting him 
parental responsibility.276  The Act also includes provision for the father to contact the 
registrar to identify himself as the father of a child and, upon confirmation of this by the 
mother, for his name to be added to the register.277.  The 2009 Act threatens a fine of 
£200 and a prison sentence of 7 days for perjury if mothers provide a false answer.  
Exceptions are however included, and these include exceptions to protect women in 
certain circumstances where they are at risk of, or in fear of, harm from disclosure. So 
while the Act is considered highly controversial by many and is designed to compel a 
mother to name the father, the list of exceptions is extensive, including the exception 
that the ‘mother does not know the father’s identity’ (c). Thus, if a mother wanted to 
conceal the identity of the father she can simply give this reason to the registrar and 
there is not much the registrar can do but leave the name of the father blank. 
 
For further discussion of the provisions of the Act see: 
A Bainham, ‘What is the point of birth registration?’ Child and Family Law Quarterly 
(2008); 20(4) : page 449  
 
                                                 
274 For further information on the background to these provisions see:  Joint birth registration: recording 
responsibility (Cm 7293) June 2008. 
275 Welfare Reform Act 2009 Schedule 6 Part 1 para 4 amending s 2 Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1953.  There are exceptions to this duty such as inter alia, where the mother does not know the identity of 
the father or fears for her safety if he were to be contacted  (s 2B(4) Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1953 as it will be amended by the Welfare Reform Act 2009) 
276 S 2C Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 as it will be amended by the Welfare Reform Act 2009. 
277 See s.2D and 10B Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 as it will be amended by the Welfare 
Reform Act 2009. 
